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I. INTRODUCTION
The French Civil Code of 1804, promulgated by Napoleon shortly
before he became Emperor, put into statutory form vast areas of French
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private law. The 2,283 articles of the original Code governed what those
trained in the common law would call the law of torts, contracts,
property, and the family (including the law of inheritance). Surprisingly,
only five of those two-thousand-plus articles (articles 1382 to 1386)1
addressed what we would call tort law. Article 1382 proclaimed the fault
principle: one must make reparation for injuries caused by one's fault.
Article 1383 then defined fault to include negligence. The remaining
three articles imposed liability based on the defendant's relationship to
some other person or thing. Article 1384 defined those situations where
one person is liable for injuries caused by another (e.g., by one's child,
employer or pupil), and articles 1385 and 1386 imposed liability for
injuries caused by one's animals and by the collapse of one's buildings.
The original texts thus adopted a dual approach: liability was either
fault-based or based on the defendant's relationship with the injury-
causing person or thing.
The French legislature has retained these meager articles basically
unchanged despite the political, economic, and social upheavals that
France has undergone since the time of Napoleon. On four occasions
the legislature amended article 1384, but those changes only affected
special cases of liability 2 and not the basic principles. The legislature
has also enacted a number of laws outside of the Civil Code that
formulate special liability rules for injuries inflicted by aircraft, cable
cars, nuclear-powered ships and plants, and motor vehicles. The first
three laws only superseded the Civil Code articles in very narrow,
specialized areas;3 and it was not until 1985, when the Parliament finally
enacted legislation to govern motor vehicle accidents, that the legislature
found it desirable to change, for a major area of French life, the liability
rules found in the Code Napoleon.4
This legislative passivity contrasts sharply with the active role which
the courts have played in developing French tort law. Since the turn of
1. The French and English texts of articles 1382 to 1386, as promulgated in 1804,
may be found in Appendix 1.
2. For the French and English texts of the present article 1384, see Appendix 2.
The footnotes to the texts designate the three amendments that are still in force. The
last of these amendments repealed an earlier amendment (not reproduced) which only
affected the liability of teachers. See 1 H. Mazeaud, L. Mazeaud, and A. Tunc, Trait6
th6orique et practique de la responsabilit6 civile no 76, at 81 (6th ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as I Trait6 th6orique]. Citations of French treatises will give both paragraph and
page numbers to facilitate the use of other editions. Although pagination varies from one
edition to the next, paragraph numbering normally remains the same. Mazeaud, Mazeaud,
and Tunc, cited here, is the principal French treatise on tort liability.
3. See 1 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 2, n ° * 77 to 80, at 82-83.
4. For discussion of this law of July 5, 1985, see B. Starck, Droit civil obligations:
1 Responsabilit6 d~lictuelle no* 588 to 644, at 283-309 (2d ed. 1986).
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the century, judicial attention has focused on the last eight words in
paragraph 1 of article 1384 (article 1384-1'),5 which holds a person
liable for injuries caused by the act "of things that he has under his
guard. ' 6 That provision attracted little attention at the time of the
Code's enactment. Everyone understood it to be a transitional provision
preparing the reader for the special rules imposing liability on the owners
of animals and collapsing buildings, the specific "things" enumerated
in the two articles that immediately followed it (articles 1385 and 1386).
No one contemplated the possibility of liability based on the defendant's
relationship with other, unenumerated things.
This inauspicious beginning did not prevent the courts from con-
structing a remarkable edifice on the slim text of article 1384-1 . Be-
ginning in the 1890s, courts found defendants liable based on their
"guard" of things whose "acts" caused injury. Courts expended tre-
mendous effort to define the concepts of "guard" and "the act of a
thing." The guardian's liability, perhaps because it resembled the owner's
liability under articles 1385 and 1386, proved to be more strict than
fault-based. This feature naturally encouraged injured persons to invoke
it, and the courts responded by applying article 1384-1 0 in a wide variety
of situations to impose something close to strict liability on guardians,
normally business enterprises or other property owners, for the injurious
"acts" of things under their guard.
In a series of lead cases, for example, the courts held the guardian
responsible under article 1384-1 ' when a tugboat's boiler exploded and
killed an employee (the Teffaine case) 7 when an uncovered shipment
of resin caught fire and destroyed adjoining property (The Resins of
Bordeaux case) 8 and when a truck driven by a department store's
deliveryman ran over a little girl (the Jand'heur case).9 As a result of
this judicial discovery of article 1384-1 0, the guard of the injury-pro-
ducing thing has largely replaced fault as the principal basis of liability
for personal injury or property damage. Ironically, the courts have
refused to extend the benefits of article 1384-1 0 to persons injured by
5. For the convenience of the reader, the respective paragraphs of Code articles will
hereinafter be designated in the French style. Thus, the first paragraph of article 1384
becomes article 1384-1°.
6. The French phrase is "des choses que l'on a sous sa garde." I have translated
"garde" as "guard" to emphasize the distinctiveness of the French concept. 4 J. Car-
bonnier, Droit civil: les obligations n* 110, at 427 (10th ed. 1979) (citing consistent recent
interpretation of "guard" by the courts). For the definition of "guard," see infra note
145.
7. For discussion of Teffaine, see infra text accompanying notes 104-17.
8. For discussion of The Resins of Bordeaux, see infra text accompanying notes
127-34.
9. For discussion of Jand'heur, see infra text accompanying notes 146-92.
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animals and collapsing buildings; for injuries inflicted by those specially
enumerated things, the victim may only invoke the potentially less fa-
vorable special provisions in articles 1385 and 1386 (the Bardinet and
Sons case).10
Describing the history of the guardian's liability under article 1384-
1 0, a story familiar to all French lawyers, serves a number of purposes.
First, it permits a substantive comparison of French tort law with the
law of strict liability as it has developed in common-law jurisdictions.
Skilled comparativists have already accomplished that task," and none
have concluded that the French approach merits emulation elsewhere.
Despite the uncertain scope of strict liability under the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher (the closest common-law analogue to the guardian's
liability under article 1384-1), we would do well to continue tending
our own garden and to avoid importing exotic varieties of liability. The
benefits of this study, therefore, lie more in the realm of process than
of substance. The history of article 1384-1 0 tells us a great deal about
how a civil-law system works. What is the role of the Code itself? How
do jurists, both judges and academics, interpret the Code? How do
courts justify their decisions applying the Code? Do the courts have a
creative, lawmaking function? What is the precedential effect of a judicial
interpretation? The answers that the French system gives to these ques-
tions should interest lawyers in this country, given what Professor Cal-
abresi calls the increased "statutorification" of American law.' 2 In
particular, the French courts have confronted, although they have not
fully resolved, the problem increasingly confronting common-law courts
of what to do with outdated statutes manifestly unsuited to present
conditions. Until at least 1985, French courts dcided almost all tort
cases under statutes drafted for a pre-industrial, pre-automotive age.
Their performance stands as a tribute to what judges can do.
II. SOURCES OF FRENCH LAW
A. Codification
The courts' role in the development of French tort law certainly
runs counter to the accepted wisdom on the effect of codification in
the civil-law tradition. Common-law judges make law, while judges in
civil-law jurisdictions supposedly apply the law made by the legislature.
Such a narrow view of the judicial function stems from the ideology
10. For discussion of Bardinet and Sons, see infra text accompanying notes 196-203.
11. See, e.g., 2 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 322-
28 (1st ed. translated by Tony Weir 1977).
12. G. Calabresi, Common Law in the Age of Statutes 1 (1982).
1302 [Vol. 48
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
of the French Revolution. 3 The principal courts of the Old Regime (the
Parliaments) were bastions of aristocratic privilege, and the judges re-
sisted any efforts at reform initiated by the king and his ministers. The
judges frequently decided cases according to their own prejudices rather
than through the faithful application of royal ordinances. To subjugate
this unruly judiciary, the Constituent Assembly, which governed France
from 1789 to 1791, enacted a law establishing a new court system with
elected judges and forbidding the courts from participating directly or
indirectly in the exercise of the legislative power.14
The statutory provision barring judges from legislating was an out-
growth of Montesquieu's writings on the separation of powers. Mon-
tesquieu had a very limited view of the judicial function. Judges were
no more than the "mouthpieces" of the law the legislature promulgated;
they were only "inanimate agents" who could modify neither the force
nor the rigor of legislation."3 This desire to make the judicial function
a mechanical one was widespread among the revolutionaries. As ex-
plained in 1790 by a rising young lawyer from Arras named Maximilien
Robespierre, the word "case law" should be banished from the French
language, because in a state with a constitution, the law applied by the
courts can only be statutory law.' 6
Hostility to judge-made law led the Constituent Assembly, when it
passed its great law of August 16-24, 1790 organizing the judiciary, to
deny the judges any power "to make regulations" and to require them
"to address themselves to the legislature whenever they think it necessary
to interpret a law or to make a new one."' 7 In other words, the judges
13. J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 25ff (2d ed. 1985).
14. Law of August 16-24, 1790, on the Organization of the Judiciary. For its pro-
visions,- see 1 H. Solus and R. Perrot, Droit judiciaire priv6 n ° ° 42 to 48, at 43-46 (1961).
For more general discussion, see J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law 374-76 (1968). Article
10 of title II of the law, which remains in effect today, forbids the courts to "prendre
aucune part A I'exercise du pouvoir lgislatif." C. adm. at 18 (Dalloz Code administratif)
(1985).
15. Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, Book XI, chap. VI.
16. Quoted ii I F. G~ny, I M~thode d'interpr~tation et sources en droit priv6 positif
n
° 45, at 91 (2d ed. 1919) [hereinafter cited as G~ny, M(thode]. G~ny's magnificent study
focuses on how judges should interpret the Code; it contains in addition a thorough
discussion of the historical origins of the Code and of the Court of Cassation (the highest
court in France). For an English translation of the 1919 edition, see J. Mayda, M~thode
d'interpr~tation (Louisiana State Law Institute 1954) (same numbered paragraphs).
The French word Robespierre wished to ban was "jurisprudence," which most scholars
have translated as "case law." The French word "loi" refers only to statutory law.
17. Law of August 16-24, 1790, tit. II, art. 12, as translated in J. Dawson, Oracles
of Law 376 (1968). For the French text (apparently still in force), see C. adm. at 18
(1985). For the subsequent interpretation of the prohibition of judge-made regulations,
see infra notes 82 and 95-97 and accompanying text.
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should not make law themselves but should refer doubtful questions of
law to the legislature itself for resolution. This legislative referral, how-
ever, was an optional procedure because the law allowed the judges
themselves to decide whether a question was doubtful."8
A necessary component of this effort to subjugate the judges was
the enactment of a comprehensive private law code to replace the mixture
of customary and received Roman law applicable in pre-Revolutionary
France. Indeed, the replacement of this tangled, often barbarous mess
with an enlightened code based on principles of reason and natural
justice and stating the law in clear and simple terms was even higher
on the revolutionary agenda than was the demolition of the old Par-
liaments.19 The Constituent Assembly realized that it was not possible
to fetter the judges unless the legislator clearly stated what the law
was.
20
Codification proved to be a more difficult task than the revolu-
tionaries had believed it to be. Moreover, domestic terror and foreign
wars distracted their attention. It was only when Napoleon as First
Consul restored order at the very end of the eighteenth century that
conditions became ripe for codification. Napoleon appointed a four-
member commission that produced a draft Civil Code in four months.
Napoleon took an active interest in the project, and it was only through
his personal tactics and occasionally high-handed efforts that the re-
calcitrant and cumbersome legislative machinery of the Consulate ap-
proved the Code, which Napoleon then promulgated on March 21, 1804.21
The promulgation of four other codes quickly followed,22 but the Civil
Code (officially designated the Code Napoleon in 1807) justly remains
the most important. It has governed most private legal relationships in
France for almost two centuries. 23
Revolutionary ideology was still widespread at the time of the Code's
drafting. Indeed, the promulgation of the Code ratified the principal
accomplishment of the Revolution: the substitution of a regime of civic
18. G. Sautel, Histoire des institutions politique depuis la revolution frangaise n0
125, at 162-63 (6th ed. 1985). For a discussion of the mandatory referral procedure
instituted in 1790, see infra text accompanying note 57.
19. W. Seagle, The Quest for Law 277ff (1941); J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition
25-29 (2d ed. 1985).
20. 1 G6ny, M6thode, supra note 16, no 41, at 82.
21. 1 G. Marty and P. Reynaud, Droit civil no 69, at 127-30 (2d ed. 1972).
22. The Penal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure,
and the Commercial Code. Id. no 73, at 137-38.
23. Upon their return to the throne in 1815, the Bourbons retained the Code under
the title of Code Civil. The subsequent French Republics, perhaps none too confident of
;their staying power, have never formally deleted the Code's references to the king. See,
e.g., C. civ. art. I (Dalloz Code civil) (1985-86).
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equality for one of special privilege. Not surprisingly, a number of its
provisions reflected the revolutionaries' views on the supremacy of writ-
ten law and the subordinate role of judges. Article 7 of a companion
law, which governed how and when the Code should take effect, denied
any further legal force to Roman law, royal ordinances, and general
and local customs, 4 while article 5 of the Code itself reiterated the
prohibition of judge-made "regulations."
To the eyes of most observers, the Code conformed to the revo-
lutionary model of a comprehensive statement of the general will by
the legislator that left to the judges only the mechanical task of ap-
plication. One potentially discordant provision was article 4, which
threatened to punish judges who refused to decide a case on account
of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the law. But it was and
still is unclear whether the drafters meant that there could be no gaps
in the Code or that the judges had to decide all cases even if there
were gaps.
B. Interpretation of the Code
In his magisterial study on methods of interpretation and sources
of French private law, first published in 1899, Franiois G6ny, a law
professor and later dean at the University of Nancy, argued that the
lawmakers of 1804 had quite a different idea on the role of codified
law. 25 According to G6ny, the Code did not emerge as a complete
statement of all the legal rules needed to resolve future cases, but had
gaps which became more pronounced with the passage of time. The
lawmakers realized the unfinished state of the Code and expected the
judges to complete it over time.
The correctness of G6ny's thesis probably depends on whom you
consider to be the lawmakers of 1804: the four professional jurists who
drafted the Code or the legislators who, pressured by Napoleon, approved
it. The professional drafters were surely on Geny's side of the issue.
Jean-Marie Portalis, the most influential of the four commissioners,
wrote an eloquent introduction to the draft prepared by the commission
in which he argued that a country could no more dispense with case
24. Law of 30 vent6se an XII [1804] reproduced in the Dalloz Code civil after article
6.
25. 1 G~ny, Mthode, supra note 16, no 46, at 97. The second or 1919 edition of
G~ny's work, cited here, reproduces the text of the 1899 edition with additions marked
by parentheses.
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law than it could dispense with statutes. 26 All the legislature could do
was promulgate general principles "fertile in their consequences." It
could not "descend" to the level of detail and could not anticipate all
cases that might arise. 27 It was for the judges to "implement, ramify,
and extend" those principles and, with the benefit of experience, to
"fill" over time the "gaps" in the Code. 21 In other words, a Code did
not emerge full blown from the breast of the legislator, but was only
made with the passage of time and the help of the courts. In fulfilling
this creative role, judges should follow, in the absence of a controlling
text, ancient usages, a course of like decisions, or a received maxim;
if nothing else were available, the judge should then resort to principles
of natural law. 29
Whether Napoleon and his fellow lawmakers, many of them old
revolutionaries, shared Portalis' views is uncertain. Portalis had very
little impact on legal writers in nineteenth century France,30 which pro-
vides strong evidence that his views were not widely accepted in 1804.
The quite different approach to the Code that did prevail through the
nineteenth century was that of the Exigetical School. 3 This new gen-
eration of academic treatise writers was bedazzled by the monumentality
of the Code and was both untrained and uninterested in pre-Code law.
Leadership quickly passed to them after a brief transition period dom-
inated by practitioners who were familiar with pre-Code authorities and
continued to invoke them before the courts.3 2
The scholars of the Exigetical School believed that the Code was
complete upon promulgation and provided a sufficient basis to resolve
all cases. All the interpreter had to do was to implement the intent of
the drafters. Where the text itself was clear, there was no need for
interpretation; the judge only had to apply the text. If the text was not
26. J-M Portalis, Discours pr~liminaire, in 1 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux
pr6paratoires du Code civil 463, 476 (1827). Fenet reproduced in fifteen volumes the
legislative history of the Civil Code. For a discussion of Portalis' role and translations
of the most significant passages from his Discours pr~liminaire, see Tunc, Methodology
of the Civil Law in France, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 459 (1975); Tunc, "The Grand Outlines of
the Code," in The Code Napoleon and the Common Law World 19-45 (B. Schwartz ed.
1954).
27. Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 470-71
(1975).
28. Id. at 476.
29. Id. at 471.
30. Portalis' Discours prliminaire was largely ignored until G6ny invoked it in 1899.
31. On the Exigetical School, see J. Bonnecase, L'6cole de l'ex~g~se en droit civil
(2d ed. 1924); E. Gaudemet, L'interpr~tation du Code civil en France depuis 1804, at
18-56 (1935). See also G~ny's devastating attack on the inadequacy of the School's approach
in 1 G~ny, M~thode, supra note 16, n ° ° 31 to 82, at 61-204.
32. J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law 382-86 (1968).
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clear, then the interpreter utilized one of three methods of interpretation,
grammatical, logical, or historical, to discover the intent of the law-
maker.33 The scholars associated with the Exigetical School, mainly law
professors, but occasionally judges, showed little interest in how the
courts were deciding cases under the Code. They believed their mission
was to make sense of the Code itself, although they naturally expected
that courts would pay some attention to their work.
From a common-law perspective, the Exigetical School took a fairly
bold approach to statutory interpretation. Nineteenth century common-
law judges tended to view statutes as alien intruders deserving as narrow
a construction as possible so as to protect the domain of judge-made
law.34 The Exigetical School did not share this hostility to statutes since
it recognized the Code as the sole source of law. There was no common
law to fall back on, and some Code article had to apply in every case.
If the context or structure of the text did not provide an answer to a
question (grammatical interpretation), then the interpreter searched for
the purpose behind the text (historical interpretation) or drew analogies
from related texts (logical interpretation). The interpreter thus did rou-
tinely what common-law judges refuse to do still: to apply a statute to
analogous cases not covered by its literal terms.35
G6ny's magisterial treatise put an end to the Exigetical School as
a respectable intellectual enterprise. He condemned as sophism the Con-
stituent Assembly's denial of a creative role for judges3 6 and ridiculed
the Exigetical School's "fetishism" for written, codified law.3 7 However,
G6ny's main point was not that the School's interpretive methods were
wrong but that they were insufficient. Like Portalis, whom he quoted
at length, G~ny believed that any Code inevitably contained gaps because
the legislature could not foresee all situations, present or future. G6ny
therefore distinguished between pure interpretation and "free scientific
research.''3 What he described as pure interpretation was basically a
33. On these methods of interpretation, see Rieg, "Rapport Franqais," in XXIX
Travaux de l'Association Henri Capitant, L'interpr6tation par le juge des r~gles dcrites
70-85 (1978). Rieg describes a fourth method of interpretation (the teleological), not utilized
by the Exigelical School, but which subsequently obtained prominence. See infra text
accompanying note 48.
34. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908).
35. For a striking exception, see Moragne v. States Marine Line, 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
where Justice Harlan reasoned by analogy from the closest wrongful death statute to
decide a maritime death case that fell between the statutory cracks. Note, The Legitimacy
of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 Yale
L.J. 258 (1972).
36. 1 G~ny, M~thode, supra note 16, n0 48, at 107.
37. 1 id. no 35, at 70.
38. 1 id. n* 1, at 2-3 and 2 id. no 155, at 74. The French term is "la libre recherche
scientifique."
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refined version of what the Exigetical School was already doing, but
with the frank acknowledgement that traditional methods of interpre-
tation sometimes did not produce an answer. For those matters on which
the legislator had no discernible intent, the interpreter must function
like a legislator and formulate a legal rule to cover the situation.3 9 In
the latter part of his study, G6ny addressed the question of how judges
should exercise in an objective scientific fashion the lawmaking power
the Code left them, thus reducing to a minimum the arbitrariness of
any personal contribution. G6ny believed this endeavor to be the more
important part of his work, and he subsequently devoted a separate
four-volume treatise to it.4
For G6ny the principal defect in the traditional method was that it
prevented any progress in the law. 41 If the judges refused to make new
law, the legislature would need constantly to intervene to perfect the
law, something nineteenth century legislators had shown themselves un-
interested in doing. 42 Despite this concern for the development of the
law, G6ny's work was nevertheless profoundly conservative. He recog-
nized the superiority of the traditional methods of interpretation in
assuring greater certainty and stability and suggested in a number of
places that the additional, back-up technique of free scientific research
would not be necessary very often, which was perhaps just as well
because it did pose dangers of arbitrariness if misused. 4
G~ny's greatest contribution was perhaps that of frankness. He
criticized traditional commentators for constructing complex edifices to
fit into the Code's framework new phenomena like life insurance, which
the Code's drafters had never heard of and for which the Code, there-
fore, contained no provisions. Once the courts recognized the existence
of that gap, they could freely develop their own rules to fill it because
the new institution of life insurance was at least consistent with the
general principle of freedom of contract recognized by many Code
articles."
But the genie that G6ny had let out of the bottle could not be so
easily contained. At the end of the nineteenth century the feeling was
widespread that conditions of life in France had greatly changed since
the time of Napoleon. The word most often used to describe the changes
39. 1 id. no 85, at 212.
40. F. G~ny, Science et technique en droit priv positif (4 vols. 1914-1924). G6ny's
work had a considerable influence on Cardozo, who cited G6ny eleven times in The
Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
41. 1 G6ny, Mthode, supra note 16, no 33, at 65.
42. 1 id. n* 50, at 105.
43. See, e.g., 2 id. no 155, at 74-76.
44. 1 id. n*0 63 to 68 and 73, at 131-47 and 160-64.
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was "machinism." '41 In the France of 1890s people recognized that in
work places and in public places there were a lot more machines around
than at the time of Napoleon, and that those machines often killed or
maimed human beings. That new social fact led many jurists to question
the adequacy of the provisions of the Code on tort liability, which
derived from a pre-industrial era and which denied compensation to a
distressingly large number of accident victims. A movement developed
to convince the courts to revivify articles 1382 to 1386, and to adapt
them to the new social realities. In other words, the mood shifted toward
an interpretation providing more generous and just compensation to
injured workers and other accident victims.
These reformers saw a potential ally in G6ny, and G6ny naturally
had some interest in their efforts to update the Code through judicial
action. The circumstances under which the first (1899) edition of G6ny's
work appeared confirmed this impression of a natural alliance. In an
ebullient preface, Raymond Saleilles, one of the most prominent re-
forming law professors of the time, argued that the law (that is, the
Code), if it were to remain just, must "yield" before transformed
economic and social conditions." Saleilles closed his preface by para-
phrasing the German scholar Rudolf Ihering's famous motto ("Through
the Civil Code, but beyond the Civil Code") to make it more provocative
still: "Beyond the Civil Code but through the Civil Code."
47
The views of Saleilles on the evolution of Code provisions to ac-
commodate new social and economic conditions provide an example of
teleological interpretation, a fourth method of interpretation described
in most modern French works on Code interpretation.4 8 Under the
teleological approach, courts interpret Code provisions in light of con-
temporary social needs. In 1904 this approach received some striking
extrajudicial support from Ballot-Beaupr6, the first president (chief judge)
of the Court of Cassation (France's highest court). In an address on
the occasion of the Code's centenary, Ballot-Beaupr6 asserted that the
courts, as long as they did not violate the letter of the Code, should
interpret its broad provisions "generously and humanely so as to adapt
45. Colliard, "La machine et le droit priv6 contemporain," in 1 Le droit privd
frangais au milieu du XX sizcle: Etudes offertes A Georges Ripert 115 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Etudes Ripert].
46. Saleilles, "Preface" to 1 G(ny, M6thode, supra note 16, at xii-xxv (reproducing
preface to first edition). The Mayda translation also contains the Saleilles preface.
47. 1 id. at xxv.
48. See Rieg, supra note 33, at 83-84. The three others are the grammatical, historical,
and logical methods of interpretation developed by the Exigetical School. See supra text
accompanying notes 34-35.
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the text to the realities and needs of modern life." '49 According to Ballot-
Beaupr6, the courts should not struggle to ascertain and implement the
intent of the legislature that promulgated the law, but the intent of the
present legislature. Under this teleological approach, the relevant question
is what the current legislative body would do if it were confronted by
the problem before the court.
While some may have understood G6ny to be saying the same thing,
his views were in fact far more conservative. He allowed judges to
engage in free scientific research, his version of the teleological approach,
only if the traditional methods of interpretation failed to uncover any
discernible legislative intent. Thus, judges had to struggle to ascertain
the intent of past lawmakers and had to respect that intent when they
found it.5o Giving judges greater freedom by allowing them to disregard
"the will" of the drafters would, according to G6ny, result in nothing
less than the destruction of that precision and stability that were the
principal merit and striking advantage of legislated law. Statutory texts
were not empty vessels into which one could put anything one wanted,
but expressions of the subjective will of the lawmaker.5' Free scientific
research was a last resort for the courts in deciding cases unforeseen
by the lawmaker, not a golden opportunity for law reform by judges.5 2
That technique simply allowed judges to obey article 4 of the Civil
Code, which commanded them, on pain of punishment for a denial of
justice, to decide all cases before them despite any claimed obscurity,
silence, or insufficiency in the law.
C. The Role of the Courts
In civil-law jurisdictions, scholars traditionally have played a major
role in the development and interpretation of the law." Creative or
systematic legal analysis appears in academic publications but very rarely
49. Ballot-Beauprt, Le centenaire du Code civil 27 (1904), as reprinted in 2 G6ny,
Mthode, supra note 16, n* 190, at 250 n.l.
50. See the rebuke administered by G~ny to two scholarly "neophytes" for brushing
aside the 1804 legislature's views on the role of fault as the basis of tort liability in their
"zeal" to establish more just reparation for accident victims. G~ny, Risques et respon-
sabilitd, 1902 Rev. tri. dr. civ. 812, 845. [The Revue trimestrielle de droit civil is the
leading French journal on private civil law. 1902 was the year of its founding].
51. 1 G~ny, Mthode, supra note 16, n0 97, at 263. In that section of the 1919
edition G~ny condemns both Ballot-Beaupr6 and the German Historical School of Savingny
for neglecting the "incontestable role" of the lawmaker's original intent.
52. For a similar analysis contrasting G~ny's method with the brand of "evolutive"
interpretation advocated by Saleilles and company, see R. David, Le droit franqais 143-
49 (1960). For a translation, see R. David, French Law: Its Structure, Sources, and
Methodology (1972).
53. J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 56-60 (2d ed. 1985).
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in judicial decisions. Such is certainly the case with respect to theories
of statutory interpretation. The French Supreme Court, the Court of
Cassation, has never discussed how it should interpret the Code. Nev-
ertheless, what it does in deciding cases is more important than the
abstract theorizing of academics. It is also more interesting from a
common-law perspective because it shows us how French judges react
to the facts that the real world presents to them for decision. Contem-
porary French academic writers seemingly agree with this assessment,
since most modern treatises, unlike the treatises authored by the members
of the Exigetical School, focus on the work product of the French courts
rather than on the development of some overall system for making sense
out of the Code.
The Court of Cassation predated the Civil Code of 1804 by fourteen
years, and its early history reflects the revolutionary distrust of judicial
lawmaking. In the summer of 1790, the Constituent Assembly had created
a system of local trial courts and had instructed the judges to address
themselves to the legislature if they believed it necessary to interpret a
law or to make a new one.54 This reliance, for insuring the correct
implementation of the law, on the judges' voluntarily referring doubtful
cases to the legislature proved short-lived. Before the end of 1790, the
Constituent Assembly established a new supreme court called the Tri-
bunal of Cassation (renamed the Court of Cassation in 1807) to insure
the correct, or at least the uniform, application of the law by the trial
courts." The new Court's role was strictly that of a policeman. It could
not decide any case brought before it but could merely determine whether
the lower court had properly applied the law. If it had, the Court of
Cassation rejected the losing party's petition (pouvoir) against the judg-
ment below; if it had not, the Court of Cassation merely annulled the
judgment and remanded the case for a new decision by another trial
court. 6 The new Court's name derived from this authority to annul
("casser") lower court judgments that violated the law.
The revolutionary Constituent Assembly certainly did not expect its
new creation to interpret, much less make, any law. The authority to
annul lower court judgments that violated the law did not include the
54. Law of August 16-24, 1790, tit. II, art. 12. See supra note 17 for present
codification.
55. Law of November 27-December 1, 1790, as discussed in G. Sautel, Histoire des
institutions politiques depuis la r~volution franqaise n° ° 125 to 127, at 162-64 (6th ed.
1985); 1 H. Solus and R. Perrot, Droit judiciaire priv6 n' 49, at 678 (1961); G. Picca
and L. Cobert, La Cour de cassation 11-15 (1986).
56. Law of November 27-December 1, 1790, tit. I, arts. 1-3, as reproduced in C.
pr. civ. at 626-27 (Appendix on Judicial Organization) (Dalloz Code de proc6dure civile)
(1986).
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authority to say what the law was. Any such authority would violate
the prohibition, applicable to all judges, against making general regu-
lations. On remand, the trial court remained free to apply the law as
it saw fit, subject to the losing party's right to petition the Court of
Cassation to annul its judgment for violation of the law. The second
trial court could therefore decide the case the same way as had the
initial trial court. If that occurred twice in the same case, that is, if
two successive trial courts had agreed with the initial trial court, then,
in the opinion of the Constituent Assembly, the law was sufficiently
uncertain to require interpretation. But, under the prevailing revolu-
tionary ideology, that interpretation could only come from the legislature.
The 1790 law establishing the Court of Cassation therefore mandated
the referral of such cases to the legislature so that the legislature could
make a "decree declaratory of the law." 7
The Court of Cassation resisted this mandatory referral of questions
of interpretation to the legislature, and most modern French authors
believe it to have been a violation of the principle of the separation of
powers for the legislature to intervene in the decision of individual
cases.a The Convention, which governed France from 1792 to 1795,
abused this power, and, with the passing of revolutionary fervor, the
Court of Cassation was gradually able to obtain for itself the last word
in deciding cases. The final step occurred in 1837, during the peaceful
years of Louis-Philippe's July Monarchy. In that year the legislature,
now called the Parliament, enacted a law that established what is basically
the present system. 9 Under that system, if the trial court on the first
remand decides the case the same way as had the initial trial court, the
losing party's second petition goes to the entire Court of Cassation and
not just to one of its chambers. The full Court's interpretation of the
law then becomes the law of the case binding the trial court on any
subsequent remand. 60 In 1967, the French Parliament simplified this
process somewhat by allowing for the first time the full Court of
Cassation to decide the case on the merits rather than remand for a
second time. 6'
57. G. Sautel, supra note 55, n' 126, at 163 (discussing law of November 27-December
1, 1790).
58. Id; H. Solus and R. Perrot, supra note 55, n°° 678 and 699, at 600-02 and 616.
59. H. Solus and R. Perrot, supra note 55, no 699, at 616.
60. The press of business before the Court of Cassation, France's only appellate
court, has required the appointment of a large number of judges divided into chambers
for the decision of cases. The convocation of the full court, all chambers united, or, as
it is now called, l'Assembl6e Pleni~re, is an unusual event. The court on remand only
rarely rebels against the Court of Cassation's interpretation.
61. J. Vincent and S. Guinchard, Proc6dure civile n* 1085, at 957-58 (6th ed. 1985).
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These developments indicate that the Court of Cassation has not
stayed within the narrow policing role assigned it by the Constituent
Assembly. Ironically, the basis for this expansion appeared in the rev-
olutionary legislation itself. In the 1790 law organizing the judiciary,
the Assembly inserted a provision requiring all judicial decrees to state
expressly "the grounds that were decisive for the judges." ' 62 That pro-
vision, which also applied to the Court of Cassation when it was
subsequently established, broke with the prior practice that treated a
judicial decision as an exercise of authority that its authors did not
need to justify or explain. As a result of this provision, the Court of
Cassation could not annul a lower court judgment without explaining
why the judgment violated the law. In explaining why the lower court
misapplied the law, the Court of Cassation would necessarily shed some
light on the correct interpretation of the law. The interpretation then
would influence subsequent courts. Thus, a provision intended to limit
the power of judges, became the principal basis for a highly developed
system of case law. 6a As French scholars recognize, there can be no
case law without reasoned decisions. 64
D. The Effect of a Judicial Decision
To understand the impact of the reasoned decision, let us look at
Montagnier v. Leydon, one of the better-known nineteenth century cases
interpreting the Code provisions on tort liability. 65 That case, decided
in 1885, involved article 1385, which governs the liability of the owner
or user of an animal. That article provided that the owner or user was
62. Law of August 16-24, 1790, tit. V, art. 15, as quoted in J. Dawson, Oracles of
the Law 377 (1968).
63. J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law 377 (1968).
64. Jestaz, La jurisprudence: Reflexions sur un malentendu, 1986 Dalloz-Sirey (D.S.)
Chr. 9. Dalloz-Sirey, generally referred to by the abbreviation "D.S.," is one of the
leading privately published French law reporters. Published weekly, it contains a selection
of recent judicial decisions with accompanying analytical notes written by law professors,
practitioners, and even judges (cited as Dalloz-Sirey Jurisprudence or D.S. Jur.). In
addition, Dalloz-Sirey publishes short articles ("chroniques") on topics of contemporary
interest (cited as D.S. Chr.). Prior to their merger in the early 1950s, Dalloz (D., D.P.,
or D.H.) and Sirey (S.) published separate reporters. Dalloz-Sirey's leading present-day
competitor is La Semaine Juridique (cited as J.C.P.), which has a similar format.
65. Montagnier v. Leydon, Cass, civ., 27 Oct. 1885, 1886 D.P. Jur. I 207, 1886 S.
Jur. I 33. For the text of the decision, see also H. Capitant, Les grands arrets de la
jurisprudence civile n' 131, at 438 (8th ed. by A. Weill, et al., 1984). A translation
appears in Appendix 3.
French citation form for cases generally does not include the name of the parties, but
only the date of the decision (here October 27, 1885) and the identity of the court (here
the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation). This article has often added the parties'
names to the citation to aid the reader's comprehension.
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"liable" for any injury caused by the animal regardless of whether the
animal remained under his guard or had become lost or had escaped.
During the nineteenth century that article generated many law suits
because work animals, especially those used to transport persons or
goods, were a major cause of personal injuries.
The reported facts in the Montagnier case are sketchy at best, as
French judicial decisions, especially those of the Court of Cassation,
devote little attention to factual background. The Court of Cassation,
whose role it is to assure the proper interpretation of the law, does not
review trial court findings for evidentiary sufficiency, but leaves all
factual matters to the trial courts' unreviewable discretion or, as the
French say, to their "sovereign appreciation." Thus, in Montagnier, the
Court of Cassation tells us only that the trial court (a Court of Appeals) 66
had found that defendant Leydon's mule had dislodged several stones
from the top of a wall and that the stones had struck and injured the
plaintiff Montagnier. In its judgment the Court of Appeals67 had found
also that the mule had bucked and that Montagnier, seated at the base
of the wall, had suffered a broken leg.
The legal issue in Montagnier was the meaning of the word "liable"
in article 1385. In other words, what was the basis for the liability
imposed by that article on the owner of the animal which caused the
injury? The Court of Appeals had nonsuited the plaintiff Montagnier
because he had not proved any fault on the part of the defendant
Leydon. According to the court, the word "liable" in article 1385 meant
that the owner or user of the animal was liable if the plaintiff proved
some fault under articles 1382 or 1383. These articles, everyone agreed,
imposed liability only when the plaintiff established that the defendant's
intentional (article 1382) or negligent (article 1383) wrongdoing caused
the plaintiff's injury. Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
article 1385, Montagnier, who could not prove the defendant's fault,
obtained no compensation for his broken leg.
Unhappy with that result, Montagnier successfully petitioned the
Court of Cassation to annul the judgment below. The Court's one-
sentence judgment, written in the classic French style which seeks to
make judgments as brief and concise as possible, reached that result
66. France has traditionally had two levels of trial court jurisdiction and one level
of appellate jurisdiction (the Court of Cassation). The trial court whose judgment was
before the Court of Cassation in Montagnier was in fact a regional Court of Appeals.
The Courts of Appeals try cases de novo on "appeal" from the lower-level trial courts
(tribunaux) found in each department.
67. Both the Dalloz and Sirey reporters reproduced the Court of Appeals' judgment
as part of their report of the Court of Cassation's judgment in Montagnier v. Leydon.
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through syllogistic reasoning. 8 The only authority cited by the Court
was article 1385 itself; there were no references to prior judicial decisions
or to the views of any scholarly writers.
The Court of Cassation's judgment in Montagnier contained three
whereas clauses and a concluding clause announcing the disposition of
the case. In the opening whereas clause, the Court gave, as the major
premise for its syllogism, its own interpretation of the word "liable"
in article 1385. That interpretation based the animal owner's liability
on a presumption of fault that the owner would find difficult to rebut.
According to the Court:
the liability provided by that article rests on a presumption of
fault imputable to the owner of the animal which has caused
the injury or to the person who was making use of it at the
moment of the accident;-and that presumption only yields be-
fore the proof of an unforeseeable event [cas fortuit] or of a
fault committed by the injured party.
In the second whereas clause, the Court supplied the minor premise for
its syllogism by reporting the facts found by the Court of Appeals.
These facts-namely, Leydon's ownership of the mule that injured Mon-
tagnier-made article 1385 the applicable Code provision. Unsurprisingly,
in its third whereas clause, the Court of Cassation found that the Court
of Appeals had violated article 1385 when it relieved Leydon of the
consequences of his liability under that article solely because'there was
no proof that Leydon was at fault. Annulment followed inexorably, as
a matter of deductive logic, from the Court of Cassation's broad in-
terpretation of "liability" in its first whereas clause. The Court of
Appeals had violated the law when it had adopted a narrower inter-
pretation.
The Court of Cassation's meager opinion (more properly called a
judgment or arrt) prompts several observations from readers familiar
with the more discursive style of common-law opinions. First, the Court,
in explaining why it annulled the Court of Appeals' judgment, did
furnish what it plainly believed to be a correct interpretation of article
1385. The Court of Cassation therefore did not limit its role to that
of a policeman annulling incorrect interpretations by the lower courts.
Second, the Court made no effort to justify its interpretation of article
1385 or to explain how it arrived at it. The Court simply announced
68. For the origins of the Court of Cassation's opinion-writing style, see J. Dawson,
Oracles of the Law 380ff (1968).
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the interpretation in formulaic style.6 9 To discover the arguments that
must have persuaded the Court, one must refer to the report prepared
for the Court by one of the participating judges whom the Court
designated to serve as rapporteur.70 The report is not part of the Court's
judgment; but, as often occurs in leading cases, one of the unofficial
reporters (Sirey) does reproduce it in full.
The rapporteur in Montagnier did little more than state the issue
(how the word "liable" should be interpreted) and summarize the ar-
guments of the parties. 71 His report does, however, convey how nine-
teenth century jurists, during the heyday of the Exigetical School, sought
to resolve a major uncertainty raised by the words of a Code provision.
Plaintiff's counsel took an historical approach to interpreting article
1385 and cited the special rules on liability for injuries inflicted by
animals in Roman law, in the customs of pre-Revolutionary France,
and in the writings of French jurists prior to codification. Plainly, the
plaintiff did not cite these pre-Code authorities as controlling but invoked
them to establish the lawmaker's purpose in treating injuries inflicted
by animals in a separate article (article 1385) after the more general
articles (articles 1382 and 1383) establishing the fault principle. 72
The plaintiff's argument was that the Code, like the pre-Code law,
contained a special provision on animals because the legislature believed
69. This practice continues unchanged today. For the analysis of a modern opinion,
see F. Schmidt, The Ratio Decidendi: A Comparative Study of a French, German, and
an American Supreme Court Decision (1965) (Uppsala, Sweden). The Court of Cassation's
practice of announcing legal rules without explaining the basis for them has recently
provoked some criticism in France. See Touffait and Tunc, Pour une motivation plus
explicite des dcisions de justice notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation, 1974 Rev.
tri. dr. civ. 493. But no change seems likely to occur.
70. On the origin and role of the rapporteur, see J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law
321-23, 402-03 (1968).
71. The rapporteur in his report often formulates additional arguments (see the
discussion of the rapporteur's role in the Jand'heur case in the text after infra note 174),
but he never advocates a particular result. In addition to the rapporteur's report, the
Court of Cassation in Montagnier also had before it the written conclusions of its advocate
general, but the private reporters did not reproduce that document. The advocate general
is a public official associated with the Ministry of Justice who appears on behalf of the
law and does argue for 'a specific result.
72. G~ny described approvingly how the Exigetical School used pre-Code authorities
in order to ascertain the drafters' intent. 1 G6ny, M6thode, supra note 16, n* 15, at 32-
33. G~ny interpreted article 7 of the law of 30 vent8se an XII, which seemingly barred
their use (see supra text accompanying note 24), to do no more than to deprive those
authorities of any obligatory force. 1 id. n' 53, at 110-111. Use of pre-Code authorities
to discover the drafters' purpose makes sense because the commissioners that prepared
the initial draft of the Code relied heavily on Pothier, Domat, Bourjon, and the other
treatise writers of the Old Regime. 1 G. Marty and P. Reynaud, Droit civil n* 69, at
128 (2d ed. 1972).
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owners and users were at least presumptively at fault for injuries inflicted
by their animals. The inclusion of article 1385 in the Code made no
sense unless the legislature intended to establish some special rule more
favorable to the injured party than the otherwise applicable general rule
of articles 1382 and 1383, which required the injured party to prove
fault. In response, defendant's counsel could do no more than cite some
general remarks from the Code's legislative history in which the Code's
defenders emphasized the fault basis for liability under the Code. More
persuasively, the defendant cited four prior decisions of the Court of
Cassation that had interpreted article 1385 to require the plaintiff to
prove fault.
The plaintiff also argued, in what proved to be the most significant
portion of his argument, that the word "liable" did more than just
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, which would allow the
defendant to avoid liability by proving due care. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant's only defense, once the plaintiff proved that the
defendant's animal inflicted the injury, would be the establishment of
some force majeure (understood to mean some unforeseeable and ir-
resistible force exterior to the animal) or some fault imputable to the
injured party. The plaintiff advanced two logical arguments to support
this position, one an argument a contrario and the other an argument
by analogy.
The plaintiff's a contrario argument derived from article 1384, which
made fathers and mothers "liable" for the wrongful acts of their children
(article 1384-2 ),73 masters and employers for those of their employees
(article 1384-30), and teachers and artisans for those of their pupils
(article 1384-4O). Article 1384-5o then provided that there was no liability
if the "father and mother, teachers and artisans, can prove that they
could not have prevented the [wrongful] act," that is, they were not at
fault. The courts had accepted previously the a contrario argument in
refusing to allow masters and employers, who were not included within
the quoted language, to exonerate themselves for the wrongs of their
employees by proving that they had exercised due care in selecting and
supervising them. The courts reasoned that the legislature communicated
its intent to apply a contrary rule to masters and employers when it
did not include them on the list of persons covered by the exoneration
provision. 74 The plaintiff sought to extend that interpretation of the
employer's liability under article 1384-3* to cover the animal owner's
liability under article 1385.
73. In this paragraph all references are to article 1384 as enacted in 1804. That article
remained unchanged in 1885.
74. See I Trait6 thgorique, supra note 2, n °- 922 to 925, at 1001-04 (emphasizing
in addition clear legislative history to exclude masters and employers).
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The plaintiff's argument by analogy, on the other hand, derived
from article 1733, which held a tenant liable for the destruction of the
leased premises by fire unless the tenant established that the fire was
caused by an unforeseeable event ("cas fortuit") or an irresistible force
("force majeure") or by some vice in the construction of the premises.
The plaintiff argued that the liability of an animal's owner or user
should be the same as that of the tenant. Despite the problems with
the analogy (article 1733 appeared to govern a special case of contractual
liability), several treatise writers had accepted it, as had several lower
courts. The plaintiff brought those authorities to the Court of Cassation's
attention, and closed with a general reference to the justice of the
interpretation advanced.
The Court of Cassation obviously found the plaintiff's grammatical,
logical, and historical arguments persuasive. The text of its judgment
interpreted article 1385 to establish a presumption of fault which the
defendant could not rebut merely by proving due care. To escape liability,
the defendant had to show either the fault of the victim or a "cas
fortuit." While the latter term is potentially ambiguous-the plaintiff
had used the term "force majeure" -French jurists have normally treated
"cas fortuit" and "force majeure" as synonyms referring to any external
force that is both unforeseeable and irresistible. 71 Perhaps the meaning
of these terms was a little vague in 1885, but the note writer who
analyzed the Montagnier case in the Dalloz reporter treated the two
terms as synonymous and recognized that the judgment did not allow
the defendant to exonerate himself by proving a mere lack of fault. 76
The liability imposed on the animal's owner thus resembles what the
common law would call strict liability.
What is the legal effect of the Court of Cassation's interpretation
of article 1385 in Montagnier v. Leydon? Civil-law systems supposedly
do not have any rule of precedent. The law is in the Code and not in
the cases; in deciding a case, even lower court judges must apply Code
provisions as they interpret them rather than slavishly following the
75. 2 H. Mazeaud, L. Mazeaud, and J. Mazeaud, Trait6 theorique et practique de
la responsabilit6 civile n* 1559 to 1561, at 674-76 (6th ed. 1970) (citing many older
authorities) [hereinafter cited as 2 Trait6 th6oriquel.
76. 1886 D.P. Jur. 1 207. The note writers, or arrtistes as they are called, contribute
invaluably to the development of the law by placing decisions in context. Their case notes,
commissioned by the private reporters, appear immediately after (or beneath) the text of
the court's judgment and analyze a decision in light of related decisions and of doctrinal
writings. The note is all the more valuable because of the absence of any such analysis
in the text of the decision itself. Today most arrotistes are professors, but in the nineteenth
century they were often practitioners.
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interpretations given by the Court of Cassation. 71 In France, a trial
court judgment lacks a legal basis and is thus subject to annulment by
the Court of Cassation if the only reason given in its support is a prior
decision of the Court interpreting the same Code provision. 71
In reality, no system handling a mass of cases could give its judges
the liberty or responsibility of deciding all issues anew. Considerations
of efficiency dictate that certain questions be settled. It is therefore not
surprising that France has developed a working system of case law. 79
There are reporting systems, parties cite cases to the courts, and the
judges are aware of prior cases and try to decide new cases in a consistent
fashion. The traditional explanation for this phenomenon is to treat it
as a factual one. Cases are at most like customs; courts normally follow
them, but they do not bind judges in the same way the written law
binds them. 0 G6ny, so revolutionary in other respects, only recognized
cases as generative of customs; a custom developed only when people
changed their behavior to accommodate judicial decisions.8" The respect
given by the courts to prior cases interpreting Code provisions is thus
purely a factual matter and not a matter of legal compulsion.
The fate of Montagnier v. Leydon demonstrates that the traditional
explanation contains a large degree of sophistry. Initially, the case at-
tracted some attention because the Court of Cassation interpreted article
1385 differently than it had in previous cases. The new interpretation
signaled a shift from liability based on fault to strict liability. For that
reason, the two private reporting services of the day selected the judgment
for publication from among the hundreds if not thousands of judgments
rendered annually by the courts. But in 1885 there was no way of
knowing whether the new interpretation would prevail. The prohibition
in the Code's article 5 against the judges making "general regulations"
has always been understood to bar, at a minimum, judges announcing
a precedent that binds other judges, even lower court judges. 2 In sub-
77. J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 36 (2d ed. 1985).
78. See, e.g., Cass. req., 21 Dec. 1891, 1892 D. Jur, I 543; Cass. crim. 3 Nov. 1955,
1956 D. Jur. I 557 (note Savatier).
79. J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law 414-15 (1968). Professor Dawson believes that
the French system is defective because it has formulated a kaleidoscope of rules without
any effort to organize them into a coherent whole. He places a good part of the blame
on the inadequacy of the reasons given by the Court of Cassation in its judgments.
80. 1 A. Colin and H. Capitant, Trait6 de droit civil no * 295 to 297, at 171-73
(edited by Julliot de la Morandire 1957); S. Belaid, Essai sur le pouvoir createur et
normatif du juge 58-66 (1974).
81. 2 G~ny, M~thode, supra note 16, no 149, at 49-53. CG6ny cites as an example
the development of notarial practices in response to court decisions. To common-law
lawyers, describing cases as generating a custom rather than as recognizing what previously
was only a custom seems odd.
82. 1 A. Colin and H. Capitant, Trait6 de droit civil no 339, at 239 (1957).
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sequent cases the Court of Cassation could therefore return to its older
interpretation; and the lower courts could choose between the old and
the new, or perhaps develop a third interpretation.
What happened in the years after 1885 to change this situation was
that the Court of Cassation repeated its new formula interpreting the
animal owner's liability on numerous occasions and annulled the judg-
ments of those rare lower courts that resisted the new interpretation by
adopting the old one."3 An influential commentator had also supported
it, although with some reservations, in a note to one of the few earlier
lower court cases adopting what became the Montagnier interpretation.14
The interpretation thus became fixed and beyond challenge; and the few
present-day academic writers who bother to challenge its soundness do
so, in the words of the leading torts treatise, "without any illusions"
about their chances of prevailing. 5
Modern French jurists have taken a more realistic view on the
function of case law. Professor Maury, in perhaps the most influential
article on the topic, recognizes that rules announced by the Court of
Cassation under the guise of interpreting the Code may acquire the
force of law through the "acceptance" of the courts and, to a lesser
extent, of scholarly writers. 6 Sometimes that acceptance comes imme-
83. 2 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 75, n0 1132, at 188 n.6 (citing a long string of
cases decided between 1886 and 1917).
84. See the note by Labb6 accompanying Paris, 23 Feb. 1884, 1886 S. Jur. II 97.
Labb believed that the heavy responsibility imposed on the owners of animals by the
new interpretation of article 1385 was more justified in the case of luxury animals kept
for the owner's pleasure than in the case of ordinary (and useful) work animals. He
nevertheless concluded that if the defendant's animal caused an injury, the defendant
could be exonerated only if he proved some other person or force was responsible for
the injury. Otherwise, the defendant must have been in some way at fault. Labb6 thus
attempted to reconcile the new interpretation of article 1385 with the fault principle.
Labb6 (a practitioner) was the most distinguished of the nineteenth century arritistes.
Meynial, "Les recueils d'arrhts et les arrdtistes," in 1 Le Code civil: Livre du centenaire
173-204 (1904).
85. 2 Trait6 th6orique, supra note 75, no 1132, at 188. The logical arguments against
the Montagnier interpretation of "liable" are particularly strong. The analogy with the
tenant's liability for fire is untenable because that obligation is based on contract (i.e.,
on an obligation that the tenant voluntarily assumed upon entering into the lease) and
covers only the special case of losses to the premises caused by fire. For all other losses,
article 1732 provides that the tenant can exonerate himself by proving the absence of
fault. Capitant, "De la preuve que doit administer le gardien d'une chose en cas oi il
est actionn6 en responsabilit6," 1937 D.H. Chr. 54. The argument a contrario fares little
better because the special provision in article 1384-5 ° for parents, teachers, and artisans
only supports a negative inference for the other categories of persons mentioned earlier
in that article and not for animal owners covered by article 1385. 2 Trait6 th6orique,
supra note 75, no 1128, at 185-86.
86. Maury, "Observations sur la jurisprudence en tant que source de droit," in 1
Etudes Ripert, supra note 45, at,28, 43-44.
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diately, while at other times it comes only with repetition, or after the
Court of Cassation has broken the resistance of the lower courts to the
new rule. 7 In either case, once a consensus has developed in favor of
a rule, the judges' liberty of interpretation (at least for lower court
judges) is only the liberty to decide a case wrongly ("celle de mal
faire"), and thus be reversed. 8 To Professor Maury, therefore, a well-
established interpretation of a Code provision, such as the interpretation
of article 1385 in Montagnier, may become a binding rule of law, at
least until a change in conditions or in the judges' perception of them
leads the Court of Cassation to change its mind. 9
In two well-known articles, Professors Boulanger and Dupeyroux
have carried Professor Maury's arguments one step further. To the
former, the fixed interpretations which Maury analyzed as legal rules
really become part of the statutory text itself, if not a substitute for
the text.9 The text "disappears under its interpretation" and the "for-
mula manufactured by the judgment is utilized as if it were the text of
the law itself." 91 To Boulanger, case law often adds to or enriches the
statutory text, and the courts therefore exercise a creative, lawmaking
power when they interpret a text. 92
Professor Dupeyroux likewise accepted Professor Maury's analysis
as a correct description of the situation, but he argued that the judges
improperly had arrogated legislative power to themselves in giving bind-
ing effect to case-law rules. 93 Dupeyroux demonstrated his point by
arguing that there were no longer any differences from the litigant's
perspective between statutory rules and case-law rules. Both now had
the same binding or legal effect. 94 For Dupeyroux, case rules that bound
subsequent judges, even lower court judges, were "general regulations"
forbidden to the judiciary by the Constituent Assembly of 1790 and by
article 5 of the Civil Code. 95 Most interpreters of article 5 had rationalized
that judges did not make "general regulations" in deciding particular
cases because the rules announced by the judges had no binding effect
in future cases. The judges were, in Portalis' words, only lawmakers
,87. Id. at 31, 44.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Id.
90. Boulanger, Notations sur le pouvoir createur de la jurisprudence civile, 1961 Rev.
tri. dr. civ. 417.
91. Id. at 426.
92. Id. at 422-25.
93. Dupeyroux, "La jurisprudence, source abusive de droit," in 2 M61anges offerts
A Jacques Maury 349 (1960).
94. Id. at 359.
95. Id. at 351.
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for "particular cases.'"' Dupeyroux did not believe that the utterances
of judges should gain any additional authority through repetition. 97 Thus,
the development of case-law rules violated article 5.
Professor Dupeyroux's observation on the comparable effect of stat-
utory and case-law rules certainly seems applicable to article 1385 and
Montagnier. By the end of the nineteenth century, litigants and their
lawyers in animal tort cases realized that the controlling rule resided
not in the text of article 1385 but in the Montagnier formula for
interpreting "liable," a formula applied by the courts in a very large
number of cases. What surprises the American observer is more the
rigidity of the Court's formula, the encapsulating of the formula into
a text that becomes almost as fixed as the statute itself, and not the
Court of Cassation's assumption of a creative, lawmaking role. After
all, the word "liable" required some interpretation, and the Montagnier
interpretation is not necessarily inconsistent with the lawmakers' purpose.
The Code's drafters plainly intended some special regime favorable to
victims; and the regime created by the Court of Cassation is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with the fault principle, which did seem uppermost
in the minds of the drafters of articles 1382 to 1386.
III. TlE DISCOVERY OF ARTICLE 1384-1 0 BY THE COURT OF
CASSATION
A. Exploding Boilers: the Teffaine Case
Work animals, a major cause of personal injuries during the nine-
teenth century, gradually disappeared from factories and city streets after
the turn of the century, and article 1385, therefore, received fewer and
fewer direct applications by the courts. Today injuries inflicted by an-
imals, other than by wild animals to which article 1385 never applied
anyway, are a rarity. The Montagnier interpretation of liability under
article 1385 nevertheless had an impact beyond the confines of that
article because many jurists at the end of the last century read it to
embody a new theory of responsibility. That theory based tort liability
on the objective creation of risk rather than on subjective fault. Its
adherents argued that it was not appropriate in an industrialized age to
impose liability only for proven fault. Rather, persons who profited
96. J-M Portalis, Discours pr6liminaire, in 13 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux
pr~paratoires du Code civil 469, 476 (1827).
97. Professor Maury might respond that the traditional interpretation of article 5
only barred judges in a particular case from binding other judges-compare the common-
law treatment of the first decision on issue as a binding precedent-and did not bar the
gradual acceptance of a settled interpretation.
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from an injury-producing activity, usually large business enterprises,
should compensate for all injuries inflicted by that activity. 98
Commentators today believe that the flowering of the risk theory
at the turn of the century was largely a response to the problem of
industrial accidents. 99 The theory certainly had its greatest appeal in that
domain. It did not appear just for factory owners or other employers
to profit from the labor of their employees and then refuse to compensate
them for the on-the-job injuries that inevitably resulted. Employers were,
nevertheless, able to escape liability for most employee injuries under
the interpretations of articles 1382 to 1386 that prevailed until the
Teffaine decision in 1896. Unless the injury was caused by an animal
(article 1385) or by the collapse of a building (article 1386), the injured
employee could sue only under articles 1382 or 1383, which required
the injured party to prove fault. That burden of proof was difficult if
not impossible to meet in the normal case of a workplace injury caused
by a machine. The courts required not only that the injured worker
establish some culpable act or omission by the employer, but also that
he prove how the exercise of greater care by the employer would have
avoided the worker's injury. Many injured employees received no com-
pensation because the cause of their injury was unknown, or at least
not connectable to some specific, proven fault of the employer. 1°° By
the end of the nineteenth century, that result appeared intolerable to a
majority of the French.
98. On the origins of this theory of risk, see I Trait6 th~orique, supra note 2, n° '
339 to 349, at 431-38; A. Weill and F. Terr6, Droit civil: Les obligations no' 685 to
690, at 756-59 (3d ed. 1980); L. Husson, Les transformations de la responsabilit6: Etude
sur la pens6e juridique 131-52 (1947); 1 R. Savatier, Les metamorphoses economiques et
sociales du droit civil d'aujourdhui: Panorama des mutations no * 274 to 307, at 332-67
(3d ed. 1964).
The originators of the theory were Professor Raymond Saleilles and Louis Josserand
whose books on the topic first appeared in 1897. See R. Saleilles, Les accidents du travail
et la responsabilit6 civile (1897) and L. Josserand, De la responsabilit6 du fait des choses
inanim~es (1897). For the translation of some excerpts, see R. von Mehren and J. Gordley,
The Civil Law System 600-11 (2d ed. 1977).
99. 1 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 2, no 344, at 433.
100. For a similar argument by Saleilles condemning the nineteenth century interpre-
tation of the texts, see his note approving the Teffaine decision in 1897 D. Jur. I 433
(note Saleilles).
Present-day French writers acknowledge that nineteenth century courts and treatise writers
often defined fault too narrowly and too subjectively. Some have suggested that if the
courts had not discovered the guardian's liability for things under article 1384-1 0 they
would have broadened the definition of fault under articles 1382 and 1383 to include
doctrines like our res ipsa loquitur. The Belgian Court of Cassation, interpreting the very
same language, took that approach at the turn of the century and never adopted the
French invention. of liability under article 1384-1 * for injuries inflicted by things. See 4
J. Carbonnier, Droit civil: Les obligations n° 110, at 422-25 (10th ed. 1979). The French
Civil Code has been in force in Belgium since 1804.
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The difficulty faced by the adherents of the theory of risk was to
find some basis for it in the Code. That task was not an easy one,
because the Code seemingly adopted a fault-based system. Even the
special provisions for injuries caused by animals (article 1385) or by the
collapse of a building (article 1386) could be interpreted, consistently
with the fault principle, to do no more than identify situations where
the presence of fault was likely and a presumption of fault justifiable.
The dilemma facing the reformers seemingly vindicated the principal
argument against codification advanced by the great early nineteenth
century German scholar Savigny and the Historical School he founded.
According to the Historical School, codification stopped the progress
of the law, which otherwise would continue to evolve so as to reflect
the spirit and consciousness of the people.
To the reformers of the 1890s, the Code's fault-based articles on
tort liability threatened to block any evolution of the law towards broader
liability based on risk creation. That evolution was desirable if not
inevitable because both popular mentalities and economic conditions had
changed since 1804. The fault-based Code texts, largely drawn from
Pothier, Domat, and the other academic treatise writers of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, embodied the Enlightenment philosophy
of individual natural rights untempered by any concern for social justice.
Under the Third French Republic, on the other hand, at least by the
1880s after the true Republicans had wrested control from the divided
monarchists, concern for the downtrodden and suffering poor, now
perceived more as victims, was higher on the public agenda. The advance
of industrialization also produced more injuries and deaths, especially
among the working class. While the Code's fault-based approach to tort
liability may have been appropriate for less mechanized times, to a
growing number of observers it seemed manifestly inappropriate for a
highly industrialized society.' 10
The Montagnier interpretation of an owner's responsibility for injury-
producing animals did give the reformers some encouragement because
it could be read to base liability on risk creation rather than on fault.
If the responsibility were fault-based, then the owner certainly should
have escaped liability upon proof of due care. The Montagnier court's
formula seemingly did not allow that but required the owner to prove
something more (a "cas fortuit") to avoid liability. Therefore, the basis
for liability was that the owner who profits from an animal should also
101. 1 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 2, no 345, at 434-35; R. Saleilles, "Le Code civil
et Ia m6thode historique," in 1 Le Code civil: Livre du centenaire 1804-1904, at 95 (1904).
By 1904, Saleilles believed that the Court of Cassation had resolved the dilemma posed
by codification in favor of the reformers. That Court's creative interpretation of Code
provisions insured the continuing evolution of the law.
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make reparation for any injuries caused by the animal. Indeed, in one
of the few snippets of legislative history which supports the risk theory,
Bertrand-de-Greuille had defended article 1385 on that very basis. 102
The reformers' difficulty was that article 1385 applied only to animals
and not to machines. Article 1386, on the owner's responsibility for the
collapse of a building, if interpreted, as seemed likely, to be at least
as favorable to the victim, was potentially more helpful because machines
in factories were often attached to buildings. That article, however,
imposed liability only for the "collapse" of a building; it seemed quite
strained to find, as some courts managed to, the "collapse of a building"
in a machine that exploded or otherwise misbehaved so as to injure a
worker or passerby. 103
In 1896, the Court of Cassation resolved this difficulty in favor of
the victim in its well-known judgment in the Teffaine case.1°4 In that
case a boiler had exploded in the tugboat "Marie," killing a mechanic
named Teffaine employed by the the boat's owners. An official inves-
tigation established that a defect attributable to the manufacturer was
the cause of the explosion. Teffaine's widow sued the tugboat's owners,
who in turn brought a warranty action to obtain indemnification for
any loss suffered against the manufacturer from whom they had pur-
chased the boiler. The Court of Appeals (the second-level trial court)
found that neither Teffaine nor the tugboat's owners were at fault, but
nevertheless found the owners liable to the widow under article 1386.
The Court did not apply the literal terms of article 1386 to find that
the explosion of the boiler constituted the collapse of a building but
reasoned, in a sweeping analogy, that if it was just to hold the owner
of collapsing building strictly liable for injuries that resulted, it was-also
just to hold the owner of an exploding boiler. The Court then found
the manufacturer had a contractual obligation to indemnify the owners
for their loss.10 5
102. In defending article 1385 before the Tribunat (an advisory legislative body),
Bertrand-de-Greuille invoked the general principle that "nothing that belongs to one person
may injure another with impunity." 13 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux pr6paratoires
du Code civil 477 (1827).
103. For an example of such a strained interpretation, see Cass. civ., 19 Apr. 1887,
1887 S. Jur. I 217. Even more remarkably, a trial court (the Paris Court of Appeals)
interpreted the collapse of a building to cover a rotted tree branch that fell on a passerby.
Paris, 20 Aug. 1877, 1878 S. Jur. II 48.
104. Cass. civ., 16 June 1896, 1897 D. Jur. I 433 (note Saleilles), 1897 S. Jur., 1 17
(note Esmein). For an English translation, see R. von Mehren and J. Gordley, The Civil
Law System 608-10 (2d ed. 1977).
105. For the judgment of the Court of Appeal, see the Dalloz reporter cited in supra
note 104. The Court of Appeals also had found the employer contractually liable to
Teffaine's widow under an implied contract to furnish the employee a safe place to work.
The Court of Cassation never approved that contractual basis for recovery.
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The tugboat's owners and the boiler manufacturer (who appeared
to be the real party in interest) petitioned the Court of Cassation. The
Court's respected Advocate General Sarrut 106 recommended in his con-
clusions that the Court annul the judgmert below. To Sarrut, it was
self-evident that article 1386 did not apply 1 ecause a tugboat was move-
able personal property, not a building.
Teffaine's widow also lacked confidence in the trial court's analogical
interpretation of article 1386, apparently, because she sought to find a
legal basis for the Court of Appeals' judgment by substituting a new
ground for that given by the court. The new ground was article 1384-
1 °, which held a person liable for the act "of things that he has under
his guard." Here the injury-producing thing was the boiler, and on the
facts of the case it was clear that the tugboat's owners were the guardians
of the boat and its boiler.
Sarrut responded that article 1384-1 0 did not establish any general
liability for injuries inflicted by things under one's guard. The paragraph
did not have any substantive content; it did no more than introduce
the special rules in articles 1385 and 1386 that modified the fault principle
for injuries inflicted by animals and by collapsing buildings. In other
words, the only "things" covered by article 1384-1 0 were the animals
and collapsing buildings more specifically provided for in the two articles
that followed. The widow Teffaine, therefore, could not invoke article
1384-1 0 because that transition paragraph did not provide an independent
basis for tort liability.
Sarrut's interpretation of article 1384-1 0 was the accepted nineteenth
century interpretation. No court had found any basis in that paragraph
for imposing liability on the guardian of a thing. The commentators
were almost unanimous in agreeing that the paragraph merely introduced
the special rules that followed for imposing liability on the owners of
animals and collapsing buildings. 0 7
106. The advocate general is a public official who represents the interest of the law
before the Court of Cassation. In his written conclusions the advocate general, unlike
the rapporteur in his report, takes a position on the merits. The private reporters oc-
casionally publish the advocate general's conclusions. In Teffaine, Dalloz published a
summary of Sarrut's conclusions. On Sarrut's high reputation as an advocate whom the
Court of Cassation normally followed, see the conclusions of Advocate General Matter
in Jand'heur II, infra note 146.
107. In an earlier exploding boiler case, a well-known commentator had proposed a
more broadly based objective responsibility for injuries caused by things. In that case,
the Court of Cassation had upheld the trial court's nonsuit of the plaintiff for failure
to prove fault under articles 1382 and 1383. The commentator labelled his idea "extra-
judicial," but he did recognize that it was possible to interpret article 1384-1 ° to cover
all inanimate things. Cass. civ., 19 July 1870, 1871 S. Jur. I 9 (note attributed to Labb6).
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In Teffaine, the Court of Cassation nevertheless found in article
1384-1 0 a legal basis for the Court of Appeals' judgment. Unfortunately,
the Court did not bother to explain how it arrived at that new inter-
pretation or to specify very clearly on what basis the guardian of the
injury-producing thing could seek exoneration. The judgment merely
confirmed that the cause of the explosion that killed Teffaine was a
defect in the construction of the boiler. According to the Court, that
fact excluded any possibility of "cas fortuit" or "force majeure" and
thus made the tugboat's owners, who were also its guardians, liable for
Teffaine's death. The judgment added that the owners could not escape
liability by proving the manufacturer's fault or the hidden nature of
the defect.
The Teffaine judgment caused a sensation at the time because it
seemingly recognized a new basis for tort liability that was general in
scope and not limited to the special cases of animals and collapsing
buildings. In addition to the traditional fault-based liability, there was
now a new system of liability based on the guard of any injury-producing
thing. This new basis of liability was apparently more favorable to the
injured party, because although the role of defendant's fault was unclear,
it received much less emphasis.
Enthusiastically defended on its merits by the adherents of the risk
theory, 08 the Teffaine decision served as the catalyst that finally per-
suaded the French Parliament in 1898 to adopt France's first Workmen's
Compensation Law, following Bismarckian Germany's example. °9 That
law, plainly based on the risk theory, required employers to compensate
employees for on-the-job injuries according to a system of fixed indem-
nities and barred any suits by employees or their families under the
Civil Code. The new law thus excluded industrial accident cases from
articles 1382 to 1386 of the Code.
The 1898 Workmen's Compensation Law reduced the practical im-
portance of the Court of Cassation's novel interpretation of article 1384-
1 °. The correctness of that interpretation nevertheless generated a sub-
stantial debate. In a series of notes published in the Sirey reporter,
The late nineteenth century Belgian jurist Laurent had advanced a similar interpretation
of article 1384-1 ° in his treatise on the Civil Code. 20 Laurent, Principes du droit civil
frangais n' 639 (1888).
108. See the books by Saleilles and Josserand cited in supra note 98 and Saleilles's
lengthy defense of the judgment in his well-known note in the Dalloz reporter.
109. Law of 9 April 1898, Sirey Lois Annotdes 761-803 (1899). For a partial translation,
see R. von Mehren and J. Gordley, The Civil Law System 611-12 (2d ed. 1977).
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Professor A. Esmein" ° challenged as inconsistent with the intent of the
Code's drafters the Teffaine interpretation of article 1384-1 .Esmein's
main point was that the drafters would have given some specific notice
or warning of what they were doing if they had intended to establish
a new general theory of liability not based exclusively on fault. Esmein
emphasized the potential breadth of the newly discovered responsibility
of guardians for injuries caused by things under their guard and warned
that liability under article 1384-1 ° for the act of a thing could all but
supersede fault-based liability under articles 1382 and 1383 as the prin-
cipal basis for tort liability. Not only was article 1384-1 ° more favorable
to the injured party, but "the number of inanimate things which could
be harmful has singularly increased in our days.""' Prophetically, Esmein
included motor vehicles in his list of harm-producing things.
The skimpy legislative history of articles 1382 to 1386 certainly
supports Esmein's argument." 2 The three designated defenders of articles
1382 to 1386 before the Consulate's legislative bodies all described a
system of fault-based liability. Tarrible did not recognize any exception
to the fault principle and explicitly stated that the special liabilities
imposed by articles 1384, 1385, and 1386 all required "some fault or
imprudence, however light might be its influence on the damage in-
flicted."" 3 On the other hand, Bertrand-de-Greuille recognized that the
provisions of those articles did depart in some fashion from the general
fault principle found in article 1382. He described how under article
1384 parents, artisans, teachers, and employers were guarantors for the
wrongs inflicted by their children, apprentices, pupils, and employees,
and how under articles 1385 and 1386 the owners of animals and
110. Professor Esmein's critical note on Teffaine appeared in 1897 S. Jur. I 17. The
majority of the discussion in the text derives from his later note criticizing Cass. civ.,
25 Mar. 1908, 1910 S. Jur. 1 17 (note Esmein). See also Cass. civ., 30 Mar. 1897, 1898
S. Jur. 1 65 (note Esmein) (Grange case).
111. 1910 S. Jur. I 17 (note Esmein), at 18.
112. The legislative history of the Civil Code, first published in 1827, fills fifteen thick
volumes. See P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux pr6paratoires du Code civil (1827).
The published materials consist mainly of two things: the debate in Napoleon's Council
of State on the commissioners' draft Code and the presentations before the legislature
(the Tribunat and the Corps 16gislatif) by. those charged with defending the Code as
approved by the Council of State. The legislative history of the present articles on quasi-
contract and tort (articles 1370 to 1386) fills only forty pages of volume 13 of Fenet
(pages 450-491), and most of those pages concern quasi-contract. The articles on tort
liability prompted no significant debate in the Council of State, and the only legislative
history normally considered relevant are the presentations by Treilhard (before the Corps
lgislatif), Bertrand-de-Greuille (before the Tribunat), and Tarrible (before the Corps
16gislatif). For translations of significant excerpts, see R. von Mehren and J. Gordley,
The Civil Law System 594-98 (2d ed. 1977).
113* 13 P. Fenet, supra note 112, at 486.
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buildings had a special responsibility to prevent injury to others."14 But
Bertrand-de-Greuille, like Tarrible, made no specific reference to article
1384-1 * and treated it as a transitional provision between the general
fault principle of articles 1382 and 1383 and the special rules for animals
and buildings in articles 1385 and 1386.
The legislative history, as Professor Esmein argued, further under-
mines the Teffaine interpretation of article 1384-1 °, because what is now
article 1385 was the sixth and final paragraph of article 1384 in the
draft Code prepared by the four commissioners and presented to the
Council of State."' The drafters thus referred in the opening paragraph
of 1384 to a person's liability for the acts of others and of things under
his guard because the article itself specified those special situations where
one was liable for what others (that is, one's children, apprentices,
pupils, or employees) did or for what one's things (that is, one's animals)
did. According to Esmein, the Council of State did not intend any
substantive change when it created what is now article 1385 as a separate
article; it merely intended to shorten the overly long article 1384.116
Professor Esmein's argument did not convince the Court of Cassation
to abandon its interpretation that article 1384-1 0 covered inanimate
"things" like exploding boilers. The legislature's creation of a risk-based
workmen's compensation system outside of the Code also did not con-
vince the Court to limit liability under the Code to cases of proven
fault. In other words, the Court did not react to the legislature's action
by abandoning any effort to read the risk theory into the Code. The
Court did, however, apply its new interpretation of article 1384-1 0 quite
cautiously during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It did
so by allowing guardians to exonerate themselves by proving that they
were not at fault and by limiting article 1384-1 to things like exploding
boilers, which carried within themselves destructive forces that escaped
to injure the person or property of another.
In interpreting the guardian's liability under article 1384-1 o , the
Court of Cassation in Teffaine did not repeat the Montagnier formula
interpreting liability under article 1385. That formula exonerated the
animal's owner only upon the owner's proof of a cas fortuit. The
Teffaine Court did not reiterate that formula because the cause of the
accident was known: the boiler had exploded and killed Teffaine because
of a hidden defect in its construction. To impose liability, the Court
114. 13 Id. 475-77. Treilhard, the third speaker, did no more than summarize the
articles.
115. 1910 S. Jur I 17 (note Esmein).
116. For the text of article 1384 (then numbered article 17) as presented to the Council
of State, see 13 Fenet, supra note 112, at 462. The legislative history supplies no other
explanation for the Council's action.
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only needed to confirm, as it did, that the hidden defect, found by the
Court of Appeals to be the cause of the accident, did not exonerate
the boiler's owners and guardians because it did not constitute a cas
fortuit or force majeure. As Saleilles immediately recognized," 7 the
Court's reasoning on the particular facts of the case would lead the
Court to adopt the Montagnier formula in any subsequent case where
the cause of the accident was unknown, that is, where the plaintiff
could not prove any hidden defect. The defendant could escape liability
only by establishing some unforeseeable and irresistible force, which is
the standard meaning of cas fortuit and force majeure.
In addition, the Teffaine Court had made clear that a hidden defect
did not qualify as a cas fortuit or a force majeure. Evidently, the
unforeseeable and irresistible force must be an external one coming from
outside the thing itself to exonerate the guardian. An unexpected bolt
of lightning that ignited the boiler might qualify, but an internal defect
did not. According to Saleilles, the Teffaine interpretation of article
1384-1 0 did not allow the defendant to escape liability by showing cas
fortuit in the broad sense of an inevitable accident that the defendant
could not have prevented through the exercise of care. The exonerating
force must be external, unforeseeable, and irresistible. Thus, under the
narrow meaning given cas fortuit by the Teffaine court, that term did
not allow exoneration in any situation not already covered by force
majeure.
The Court of Cassation, however, promptly changed its mind, which
should remind us that in France a single decision, even a recent decision
by the Court of Cassation on a new point of law, does not bind
subsequent courts as a common law precedent does. It is only the
acceptance of an interpretation in a series of decisions that gives judge-
made law its force. Thus, the year after Teffaine, another chamber of
the Court of Cassation adopted a different interpretation of the guar-
dian's liability under article 1384-1 o.18 Once again a boat's boiler had
exploded, killing an employee named Grange; but this time the official
investigation found that the boat was properly constructed and main-
tained. The Court of Appeals found the boat's owner and guardian not
liable "because it was impossible to determine the cause of the accident
which must belong to the category of inevitable accidents escaping all
foresight and not engaging any liability."'1 9 The Court of Cassation
rejected the widow Grange's petition because it found no violation of
117. See Saleilles's note to Teffaine in 1897 D. Jur I 433.
118. Cass. req., 30 Mar. 1897, 1897 D. Jur. I 433 (note Saleilles) (reported with
Teffaine), 1898 S. Jur. I 65 (note Esmein) (Grange case).
119. The Sirey reporter, see supra note 118, reproduces the text of the Court of
Appeals' judgment in Grange.
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the law in the lower court's interpretation. Plainly, that interpretation
of the guardian's liability under article 1384-1 0 conflicts with the Teffaine
interpretation because it exonerates the guardian who exercised due care
when the cause of the action remains unknown, while Teffaine requires
the guardian to prove the specific cas fortuit or force majeure that
caused the accident.
In the years preceding World War I, most courts interpreted article
1384-1* consistently with Grange. Indeed, the Court of Cassation, in-
*cluding the Civil Chamber which had decided Teffaine, did so on a
number of occasions.1 20 While the Grange interpretation did not develop
into a rigid formula, its effect was to exonerate the guardian upon a
showing that the accident could not have been prevented by exercising
due care. Article 1384-1 , under this interpretation, embodied only a
presumption of fault which shifted to the defendant the burden of proof
on the issue. The matter remained unsettled, however, and a number
of lower courts interpreted article 1384-1 0 to adopt a risk theory, making
it more difficult for the guardian to escape liability. 12' Thus, the inter-
pretation of the guardian's "liability" under article 1384-1 0 adopted by
the majority of the decisions in the years after Teffaine did not help
accident victims nearly as much as did the established Montagnier in-
terpretation of the animal owner's "liability" under article 1385.
The courts also tended to limit article 1384-1 0 by applying it only
to things that carried within themselves destructive forces (like exploding
boilers) and not to things that injured while operated by the hand of
man (like automobiles).,2 2 The Court of Cassation, for example, refused
to apply article 1384-1 0 to an automobile that, while driven by a man,
killed a pedestrian. 23 This limitation on the coverage of article 1384-1 °
seemed consistent with the language of the text, which imposed liability
for the "act" of a thing. Under this interpretation, the thing itself must
contain some defect or vice which releases the injury-producing force.
The injury must be attributable to the thing rather than to the person
operating it.'2 This limitation, combined with the exclusion by virtue
of the workmen's compensation law of industrial accident cases from
its coverage, left for article 1384-1 0 only a narrow range of cases. 21
120. A. Weill and F. Terr6, Droit civil: Les obligations n' 691, at 759-60 (3d ed.
1980).
121. 1 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 2, n' 82 to 84, at 84-85.
122. 2 Trait6 th6orique, supra note 75, n' 1216, at 326-27.
123. Cass. req., 22 Mar. 1911, 1911 D. Jur. I 354, 1914 S. Jur. I 213.
124. See, on this explanation for the limitation, the note by Savatier in 1920 D. Jur.
1 169 (note Savatier) (The Resins of Bordeaux case).
125. Savatier, Le gouvernement des juges en matire de responsabilit6 civile, in I
Introduction A l'6tude du droit compar: Recueil d'6tudes en l'honneur d'Edouard Lambert
455, 457 (1938) (hereinafter cited as Etudes Lambert).
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The paradigmatic case was that of the passerby or adjoining property
owner injured by an exploding piece of mechanical equipment. 26
B. Spreading Fire: The Resins of Bordeaux Case
In the early 1920s the Court of Cassation breathed new life into
article 1384-1 °. The most significant case, at least from the public's
perception, was the 1920 decision in The Resins of Bordeaux.127 The
defendant railroad in this case used uncovered vats to store resin in the
port area of Bordeaux. A fire somehow broke out and ignited the resin,
which spread to the adjoining property of the plaintiff and did consid-
erable damage. The plaintiff, after unsuccessfully trying to prove the
railroad's fault in setting the fire (the cause of the fire remained un-
known), sought to recover from the railroad as guardian of the resin
under article 1384-1 o. The Court of Appeals refused to apply that article
because it found that the plaintiff's injury was not attributable to any
defect in the resin, which had merely transmitted the fire.
The Court of Cassation, in an opinion reminiscent of its opinion
in Montagnier, annulled that judgment for violating article 1384-1 o. In
its first whereas clause, the Court interpreted article 1384-1 0 to impose
strict liability on the guardian of the injury-producing thing. The guard-
ian could escape liability only by proving that an unforeseeable event
or irresistible force caused the injury. According to the Court:
Whereas, the presumption of fault provided by that article against
one who has under his guard the inanimate thing which caused
the injury may be rebutted only by proof of an unforeseeable
event [cas fortuit] or an irresistible force [force majeure] or
other external cause not imputable to the guardian; and it does
not suffice to prove that he has committed no fault or that the
cause of the injury remains unknown; and it is not necessary
that the thing have an inherent defect susceptible of causing the
damage because the article [article 1384-1 °J attaches liability to
the guard of the thing and not to the thing itself.
Given that interpretation of article 1384-1 ° as the Court's major premise,
the result in the case followed inexorably as a matter of deductive logic.
The railroad, the guardian of the injury-producing resin, was unable to
establish the cause of the fire. The facts found by the Court of Appeals
(the trial court) thus fit within the major premise. That match is not
surprising because the Court certainly formulated its interpretation to
126. Cass. civ., 21 Jan. 1919, 1922 D. Jur. I 25 (note Ripert) (locomotive exploded
damaging adjoining property).
127. Cass. civ., 16 Nov. 1920, 1920 D. Jur. I 169 (note Savatier), 1922 S. Jur. I 97
(note Hugueney).
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be broad enough to encompass the facts of the case. The conclusion
readily followed that the railroad, the guardian of the resin, could not
escape liability under article 1384-1 0 by claiming that its flaming resin
did not have an internal defect that caused it to ignite, but merely
transmitted a fire started elsewhere. Thus, the Court of Appeals violated
the law when it refused to apply that article.
The broad interpretation of the guardian's liability in The Resins
of Bordeaux is significant in at least three respects. First, the Court
clearly adopted an expanded version of the Montagnier interpretation
of liability. In the Court's view, article 1384-1 ° did more than shift the
burden of proof, and the guardian could obtain exoneration only by
establishing some cause for the accident not imputable to the guardian.
The adherents of the risk theory promptly cried victory. 28 Other more
conservative jurists wondered why the rule formulated on liability for
animals also applied to inanimate things. Were not animals different
because they had a will of their own which justified imposing special
responsibilities on their owners? 29 Despite this disagreement on the
merits, both sides recognized that the Court of Cassation had now
settled the issue.
Second, the Court interpreted article 1384-10 to cover things that
did not have within themselves some defect that unleashed a destructive
force. This extension, however, was of uncertain scope. What if a spark
generated by the tool of a railroad employee had ignited the resin?
Could the injured party have recovered from the guardian railroad under
article 1384-5', which required proof of the employee's fault for the
employer to be liable? 3 ° The latter interpretation reflected the prevailing
understanding, but it seemed illogical for the injured party to be worse
off in the hypothetical case than in the actual case where the cause of
the fire on the railroad's property remained unknown. It was, therefore,
at least likely that the courts would apply article 1384-1 0 in both cases.
Third, the Court introduced the idea that the liability imposed by article
1384-1* derived not from the nature of the thing, but from the "guard"
of the thing. The full significance of this new perception became apparent
only later.
The Resins of Bordeaux case attracted considerable public attention
and awakened large segments of the French public to what the Court
of Cassation had accomplished under the guise of interpreting article
128. See the note by Savatier in the Dalloz reporter cited in supra note 127.
129. See the note by Ripert, supra note 126, to The Resins of Bordeaux and several
similar cases.
130. Savatier asked a similar question in his note to The Resins of Bordeaux in the
Sirey reporter, supra note 127.
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1384-1 0. The potential liability faced by property owners became a matter
of public concern. In 1922, two years after the date of the decision,
The Resins of Bordeaux became the victim of at least a partial legislative
overruling. 3 The aftermath of that legislative intervention demonstrates
that the French system also encounters problems when case law and
statute law interact. It also confirms the wisdom of Portalis' view that
a Code should only state general principles and leave the details for
the courts to resolve. The French Parliament spurned that advice when,
in overreacting to a particular case, it cluttered the Code with a detailed,
special interest provision, which fit badly with the remaining legal land-
scape.
The Resins of Bordeaux did not prompt any legislative reconsid-
eration of the new basis for tort liability found in article 1384-1 o. That
issue had been raised by Professor Ripert, who asked why the tort
system should favor an injured party's recovery against the immediate
guardian of an injury-producing thing rather than against more remote
parties, such as the manufacturer, who were more likely to be the parties
really at fault. 32 But that issue was too big or difficult for the legislature
to resolve. Rather, the 1922 Parliament addressed a much narrower
concern: the potentially horrendous liability of property owners for the
spread of fire. Fire insurance companies convinced Parliament that home-
owners faced drastic increases in their liability premiums now that they
were responsible for injuries caused by fires that either started or spread
from their premises, even if they were not at fault. The specter of
massive liability when one's property did no more than spread a fire
originating elsewhere particularly disturbed the legislature.'" Parliament
responded by amending article 1384 to provide that the owner of im-
movable or moveable property that "caught fire," or anyone else who
had an interest in the property, was responsible for any injury caused
by the fire only in cases of proven fault. 34
Interestingly, the legislature accomplished this partial overruling of
The Resins of Bordeaux in a way that affirmed the remainder of the
Court of Cassation's interpretation of article 1384-1 °. Parliament inserted
this limitation on liability for fires in two new paragraphs immediately
following the eight words in article 1384-1 0 on which the Court of
Cassation had based the guardian's liability for injuries inflicted by
131. Law of 7 Nov. 1922, 1922 Sirey Lois Annot6es 797 (adding new paragraphs 2
and 3 to article 1384).
132. See note by Ripert cited in supra note 126.
133. See the committee reports and debate reproduced in 1922 Sirey Lois Annotdes
797.
134. Law of Nov. 1922, 1922 Sirey Lois Annot~es 797 (adding new paragraphs 2 and
3 to article 1384).
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things. The amendment, which opened with the word "however," thus
established an exception to the general principle found in article 1384-
1 . A person was in general "liable" for the act of "things that he
had under his guard." However, guardians or possessors of things that
caught fire were liable only if the victim proved fault. Treatise writers
have generally agreed that the 1922 legislature implicitly approved by
this action the Court of Cassation's discovery in article 1384-1 0 of a
new basis for tort liability.' 31 In fashioning an exception for things that
catch fire, the legislature recognized the general rule of liability for
injuries caused by things under one's guard.
The exception for things that catch fire has attracted sharp academic
criticism. 3 6 Why should the guardians of things that catch fire benefit
from an exception to the prevailing strict liability, an exception not
available to guardians of things that explode or collapse? Why should
the guardian enjoy that benefit even if the fire started on his property,
surely a more commonplace occurrence than one's property transmitting
a fire started elsewhere? The insurance industry's threat of increased
premiums has also provoked disbelief.' 37 Did the industry believe that
The Resins of Bordeaux case would somehow increase the number of
fires? If not, and any such argument seems untenable, the amount of
fire damage would remain constant. After the 1922 law, property owners
who were victims of a spreading fire could no longer recover from
property owners earlier in the fire chain unless they could prove fault.
More fire victims would need to resort to first-party insurance, which
would as a result become more costly. The legislature's limiting the
property owner's liability, therefore, did not affect the total amount of
fire losses or the total premiums needed to cover them.
The interaction between the general rule in article 1384-1 0 and the
exception in articles 1384-2' and 1384-3 ° has also produced indefensible
results in actual cases. The exception only applies to property "that
catches fire." A spark emitted by a locomotive or other machine is not
a thing which has caught fire because its burning condition, deliberately
produced by man, lacks the destructive qualities necessary for a "fire."
Under this grammatical interpretation of article 1384-2', adjoining prop-
erty owners whose property the spark ignites can invoke article 1384-
1 0 against the guardian of the offending machine that emitted the
135. 2 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 75, n* 1145, at 200-01; A. Weill and F. Terrd,
Droit civil: Les obligations n' 693 at 761 (3d ed. 1980).
136. 2 Trait6 thorique, supra note 75, n' 1334, at 439 (citing near unanimity of
academic writers).
137. See note by P. Esmein to Ass. Plen [Assembl6e Plenitre of the Court of Cassation],
25 Feb. 1966, 1966 D.S. Jur. I 389.
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spark.' But what if the spark accidentally ignited some hay or other
property on the guardian's premises, and that "fire" then spread to
destroy adjoining property? Courts understandably resisted applying the
exception, which would require the adjoining property owners to prove
fault in order to recover, to these cases. Why should the guardian of
a locomotive benefit from the fact that some other thing under its guard
transmitted the fire if the origin of the fire was the locomotive's spark?
In 1966 the full Court of Cassation nevertheless settled the question in
the guardian's favor. The Court interpreted the exception in article 1384-
20 to apply whenever the defendant's property "caught fire," regardless
of how the fire began.3 9 Adjoining property owners injured by the
spread of the fire, therefore, had to prove fault to recover.
This interpretation of article 1384-2' appears to be consistent with
its language (grammatical and logical interpretation) and the legislative
intent (historical interpretation) behind the 1922 amendment. But the
irrationality of the distinctions drawn to separate fault-based liability
for fires from the strict liability otherwise imposed on guardians of
things under article 1384-1 0 has prompted calls for legislative action,
calls that have so far gone unheeded.' 40 This specific special interest
legislation has proved to have considerable staying power, and the avail-
able interpretive techniques do not provide the courts with any means
for getting rid of it. Thus, the French courts have respected the leg-
islatively created anomaly of limited liability for fires.
One suspects that the law would have developed more coherently if
the courts had continued to interpret the provisions of article 1384-1 0
addressing the guardian's liability for injuries caused by things without
any legislative interference. Once the courts recognized a general re-
sponsibility for the act of things, The Resins of Bordeaux was, as one
commentator recognized, almost a banal application of the principle.141
After all, the fire did originate on the defendant's premises, 42 although
the plaintiff could prove no fault on the defendant's part, and the
flaming resin did escape from the defendant's premises to ignite adjoining
property. If the resin had served merely as a conduit spreading a fire
that had originated elsewhere, a case where the 1922 Parliament evidently
believed that strict liability would be unjustified, the result might well
have been different under the interpretation given article 1384-1 * in The
Resins of Bordeaux. The Court of Cassation's formula would have
138. 2 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 75, n* 1357, at 446-448.
139. Ass. Plen., 25 Feb. 1966, 1966 D.S. Jur. I 389 (note Esmein).
140. See note by Esmein, supra note 137.
141. See note by Hugueney to The Resins of Bordeaux in 1922 S. Jur. 1 97.
142. For confirmation of this fact, see the earlier judgment of the Court of Appeals
of Bordeaux, reported under Cass. civ., 19 Mar. 1912, 1912 D.P. Jur. I 325.
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required the lower courts to determine whether the fact that the fire
originated elsewhere exonerated the defendant because it was an "external
force" that was "unforeseeable" and "irresistible." Sensible application
of that formula by the courts would have given property owners sufficient
protection.
C. Motor Vehicle Accidents: The Jand'heur Case
The full flowering of the guardian's liability for injuries caused by
things under his guard came only with the application of article 1384-
1 to injuries inflicted by motor vehicles in motion. That development
did not occur until the 1920s, nearly thirty years after the Court of
Cassation's discovery of article 1384-1 0 in Teffaine. That delay reflected
caution by the courts and the practicing bar in developing an apparent
exception to the general rule of fault-based liability. Many jurists initially
perceived the exception as applicable only to things with inherent defects
that released destructive forces. In those cases the "act of the thing"
caused the injury, not the act of the human being who controlled it.'"4
On the other hand, injuries inflicted by motor vehicles normally involved
some act of the driver and only rarely were attributable to a defect in
the vehicle.'14 Thus, courts normally decided motor vehicle accident cases
under articles 1382 and 1383; in order to recover, the injured pedestrian
or other plaintiff had to prove the driver's fault.
Very few plaintiffs in motor vehicle cases before the early 1920s
sought to avoid that burden by invoking article 1384-1 °. The Resins of
Bordeaux case changed the situation. In that case, the Court of Cassation
recognized that the basis for liability under article 1384-1 0 was the
defendant's guard of the thing and not any defect in the thing. This
new interpretation naturally encouraged pedestrians struck by motor
vehicles to sue the vehicle's guardian (usually the owner) 145 under article
143. In his report in the Jand'heur H case, see infra note 146, Judge Marc'hadour
so explained the Court of Cassation's restrictive interpretation of article 1384-l' from
Grange until the early 1920s. According to Judge Marc'hadour, the guardian had obtained
exoneration in those cases, not by proving lack of fault, but by proving that the injury-
producing thing was properly manufactured and maintained.
144. Modern treatise writers have preferred this explanation. See e.g., A. Weill and
F. Terr6, Droit civil: Les obligations no 691, at 759-60 (3d ed. 1980).
145. The "guard" and the ownership of a thing are two different concepts, but in
the great majority of cases they overlap. The courts define the "guard" as the use,
direction, and control of the thing and not as its possession. B. Starck, Droit civil
obligations; 1 Responsabilit6 d6lictuelle no 456, at 225 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, the owner
of a vehicle (i.e., the insured) retains the "guard" even if he allows an employee or
family member to drive it. However, it is well established that a thief, or an employee
who uses the employer's thing for personal ends, acquires the guard and thus terminates
the owner's liability as guardian under article 1384-1 0. Id. n o 502, at 245.
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1384-1 0. One of those injured pedestrians, a young girl named Lise
Jand'heur, made legal history by becoming the winning party in the
most celebrated case in French private law. In Jand'heur II, the full
Court of Cassation definitely interpreted article 1384-1 0 to impose on
guardians of things a presumption of liability, not just of fault, for all
injuries inflicted by things under their guard.14 The Jand'heur II Court
recognized that article 1384-1 0 established a broad domain for something
akin to strict liability. As will be seen more fully below, the Court's
interpretation gave accident victims a compensation system for injuries
inflicted by motor vehicles, which they had not been able to obtain
through direct legislative action. 47
The Jand'heur facts were simple but tragic. In April 1925, a delivery
truck driven by an employee of a local department store (Les Galeries
Belfortaises) struck and permanently crippled the young Lise Jand'heur.
Her widowed mother sued the department store, as guardian of the
delivery truck,' 41 under article 1384-1 0 and, as employer of the deliv-
eryman driving the truck, 49 under article 1384-5 *. The initial or lower-
level trial court (the tribunal de Belfort) found article 1384-1 0 applicable
to the facts and allowed the department store to exonerate itself only
by proving that the girl's injuries were attributable to her own fault.' 50
Rather than attempt that proof, the department store appealed to the
regional Court of Appeals at Besanqon, which, trying the case de novo,' 5'
146. Ch. R~unies [Chambres R~unies], 13 Feb. 1930, 1930 D. Jur. I 57 (rapport
Marc'hadour) (conclusions Matter) (note Ripert), 1930 S. Jur. I 121 (note P. Esmein).
See also H. Capitant, Les grands arr8ts, supra note 65, at 465. For a translation of the
judgment, see Appendix 5 (Jand'heur I).
147. Since the early years of the century, there had been various efforts to enact
legislation to make it easier for victims of motor vehicle accidents (especially pedestrians)
to obtain compensation. The difficulties in proving fault and the resistance of insurance
companies to the payment of claims evidently left many injured persons uncompensated.
No legislation applicable to motor vehicles ever passed, but in 1924 the French Parliament
did enact a special law which imposed strict liability for ground damage inflicted by
aircraft. On the proposed legislation, see notes by Ripert in 1925 S. Jur. I 5 and by P.
Esmein in 1924 S. Jur. 1 321. See also 2 Trait6 th6orique, supra note 75, n* 1263, at
365.
148. The courts have generally found that the employer retains the guard of any tools
or equipment utilized by employees for work purposes. See supra note 145.
149. Employers are strictly liable for the wrongs of their employees under article 1384-
5°0 but the injured party must prove the employee's fault to recover from the employer
on that basis.
150. The fault of the victim is an external force that exonerates the guardian if the
guardian proves that it was unforeseeable and irresistible. For excerpts from the tribunal's
decision, see the report of Judge Marc'hadour, supra note 146, and the subsequent decision
by the Lyon Court of Appeals, 7 July 1927, 1927 S. Jur II 106.
151. The Courts of Appeals function as a second level of trial courts. They do not
review decisions by the initial trial courts, but decide de novo all "appeals" before them.
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rejected the application of article 1384-1 0 and allowed the widow Jand'heur
to recover only upon proof of the driver's fault, something she was
evidently unable to do. According to the Court of Appeals, the pre-
sumption of fault in article 1384-1 * did not apply to things directed by
the hand of man, such as the delivery truck driven by the department
store's employee.' 52
The widow Jand'heur petitioned the Court of Cassation to annul
the Court of Appeals' judgment for violation of article 1384-1 °. The
interpretive issue in the case was: What was the "act of a thing" that
the guardian was presumptively liable for under article 1384-1', and
how did it differ from the "act of a man" that the actor or his employer-
guarantor was liable for only upon proof of the actor's fault under
articles 1382 or 1383? The interpretation given the statutory term "act
of a thing" was of great practical significance because that interpretation
would determine the scope of the "strict" liability imposed by article
1384-1 . In other words, the Court of Cassation had to establish the
respective domains of the fault-based liability system under articles 1382
and 1383, which favored defendants, and the new system of strict liability
for injuries inflicted by things under article 1384-1 *, which favored
plaintiffs.
In Jand'heur I the Court of Cassation's Civil Chamber annulled
the judgment below, thus placing the Jand'heur facts within the domain
of strict liability.15 3 In so doing, the Court followed the conclusions of
its Advocate General Langlois. In his written conclusions,1 14 Langlois
analyzed at great length the Court of Cassation's prior decisions under
article 1384-1 0 and the published notes by leading scholars commenting
on those decisions. Surprisingly, Langlois did not address the issue as
one of statutory interpretation. He did not invoke any of the theories
of interpretation described earlier in this article, nor were his arguments
either text-based or policy-oriented, as one would expect if he had
believed there were a gap in the law. Rather, he focused on the legal
rules which the Court of Cassation had formulated in its prior cases
under the guise of interpreting article 1384-1 0 . For Langlois, the task
of the Court of Cassation in Jand'heur I was to formulate a clear rule
for determining what cases fell under the fault-based system (articles
1382 and 1383) and what cases fell under the strict liability system
152. The private reporters do not reproduce the full text of the Court of Appeals'
judgment, but the 1927 judgment of the Court of Cassation's Civil Chamber (translated
as Jand'heur I in Appendix 4) reproduces the substance of its reasoning.
153. Cass. civ., 21 Feb. 1927, 1927 D. Jur. 1 97 (note Ripert), 1927 S. Jur. I 137
(note P. Esmein). For a translation of the judgment, see Appendix 4 (Jand'heur 1).
154. For the full text of the conclusions, see 1927 Gazette du Palais 1 407. The Gazette
du Palais (Gaz. Pal.) is another private reporting system.
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(article 1384-1 ). Langlois plainly believed that the Code itself did not
give the Court of Cassation much assistance for that difficult and
important task.
In recounting the prior decisions under article 1384-1 ° , Langlois
sought to establish two basic points. First, the Court of Appeals' in-
terpretation, which excluded from article 1384-1 0 things operated by the
hand of man, was inconsistent with prior interpretations by the Court
of Cassation. In the exploding boiler cases the Court of Cassation had
not inquired whether the acts of the workers operating the boiler played
any role in the explosion, and in The Resins of Bordeaux case it had
applied article 1384-1 ', even where there was no defect in the injury-
producing thing. Thus, one could no longer limit liability for the act
of a thing to defective things (e.g., to a motor vehicle whose brakes
suddenly failed). It was also untenable to exclude from the act of things,
as suggested by a leading commentator, 5 ' things in perfect obedience
to their operators, because that description did not conform to the facts
of the real world. The operator of a thing like a motor vehicle never
has complete control over it. Common sense tells us that motor vehicles
do not always stop or turn on command, or at least not as rapidly or
precisely as the driver might wish.
Second, Langlois argued that the only appropriate basis for limiting
the application of article 1384-1 0 was the dangerousness of the thing
subject to the guard. That article applied to dangerous things such as
automobiles which had their own internal dynamic over which the guard-
ian could lose control. For injuries inflicted by nondangerous things,
the victim had to prove some human actor's fault in order to recover.
Here, Langlois was seeking to defuse the department store's argument
that applying article 1384-1 0 to things operated by man would allow
the exception to swallow the rule. According to the department store,
even a kick in the pants would fall within article 1384-1 0 if the defendant
were wearing shoes.
The Court of Cassation plainly welcomed the suggestion of its
advocate general for limiting the scope of article 1384-1 ° , because the
recommended limitation appeared in the Court's opinion in Jand'heur
I annulling the Court of Appeals' judgment. The Court of Cassation
spoke through its Civil Chamber as it normally does in tort cases. The
judgment itself contained, in the typical, concise French style, three
whereas clauses and a disposition clause. In the first whereas clause,
the Court recited its now familiar formula on the presumption of fault
imposed on the guardian by article 1384-1 °. The Court's language closely
tracked the language used in The Resins of Bordeaux. In its second
155. See the note by Savatier in 1925 D. Jur. II 41.
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whereas clause the Court merely reported the facts as found by the
lower courts. The Court then opened its third whereas clause with the
ominous "But whereas," a sure sign that annulment would follow. After
rejecting the Court of Appeals' distinction between things operated or
not by the hand of man, the Court formulated as the correct rule: "it
suffices [for the application of article 1384-1 0] that it is a thing subject
to the necessity of a 'guard' by reason of the dangers to which it may
expose others." Because the Court of Appeals had invoked, in support
of its refusal to apply article 1384-1 °, a reason that had no basis in
the text as interpreted by the Court of Cassation, that Court annulled
the lower court's judgment in the disposition clause of the judgment.
The Court of Cassation did not rule whether a delivery truck was
a dangerous thing necessitating a guard under article 1384-1 0 because
that question was a factual one for the trial courts. The Civil Chamber
therefore remanded Jand'heur to another Court of Appeals for a decision
on the merits. As Jand'heur I demonstrates, the Court of Cassation
itself only interprets the law; it neither finds the facts nor reviews the
lower court's findings of fact for evidentiary sufficiency.15 6
The Court of Cassation's Civil Chamber plainly rendered in Jand'heur
I what it considered to be a judgment of principle and not just a
decision in a particular case. In other words, it formulated a rule far
broader than required by the facts of the case. Indeed, the Court
formulated a standard for determining the respective domains of fault-
based and strict liability. The Court plainly sought to provide a definitive
resolution to a controversy that had raged for a number of years. The
Civil Chamber had previously applied the system of strict liability for
the act of things to a motor vehicle operated by a driver in a 1924
decision, 117 discussed at length by Advocate General Langlois, but that
judgment was not so clearly or broadly reasoned as Jand'heur I. Some
lower courts had adopted that interpretation, but others had refused to
do so and had required pedestrians struck by cars to prove fault under
articles 1382 or 1383 in order to recover.
The situation in the lower courts in the mid 1920s was, according
to one commentator, one of anarchy.'5 The Court of Cassation's new
156. Professor Ripert did argue that the Court of Cassation could exercise greater
control over the trial courts by defining more precisely what it meant by "danger." See
Ripert's note to Jand'heur I, supra note 153. Such an approach resembles the phenomenon
described in the infra text accompanying notes 167-72, whereby the interpretive efforts
of subsequent courts focus on the text of the Court of Cassation's formula rather than
on the statutory text. Here the word subject to interpretation ("danger") does not even
appear in article 1384-1° .
157. Cass. civ., 29 July 1924, D. Jur. 1 5 (note Ripert), 1924 S. Jur. I 321 (note P.
Esmein).
158. See the note by Ripert to Jand'heur I cited in supra note 153.
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interpretation of article 1384-1 0 had not yet become settled. Trial court
judges had difficulty accepting the major shift from a fault-based system
to a system of strict liability in motor vehicle accident cases, which
surely comprised a substantial portion of their case load. Resistance by
lower court judges to Court of Cassation decisions is an accepted feature
of the French legal scene because a particular decision, or even a string
of decisions, are not precedents which bind the lower courts. But the
commentators on Jand'heur I wondered whether the Court of Cassation
had now spoken so forcefully that the lower courts would find it prudent
to fall in line with the Court's newer, broader interpretation of article
1384-1 0159
The lower courts, however, resisted the new interpretation. The Court
of Cassation, after annulling the judgment of the Court of Appeals of
Besancon, remanded Jand'heur to the Court of Appeals of Lyon for a
decision on the merits. Strictly speaking, the Court of Cassation does
not "decide" a case, but merely determines whether the lower court's
judgment has violated the law. If it has, the Court annuls the judgment
and remands the case to another Court of Appeals for a new decision.
The Court of Appeals on remand repeats what the first Court of Appeals
did and retries the case to determine whether to confirm or modify the
judgment of the lower-level trial court that initially decided the case.
Of course, in annulling the first Court of Appeals' judgment, the Court
of Cassation usually interprets the relevant Code provisions, but that
interpretation does not bind the first remand court as it would under
the "law of the case" doctrine in the common-law world. In Jand'heur
on remand, the Court of Appeals of Lyon refused to apply article 1384-
1 0 to the facts of the case for precisely the same reason that the earlier
Court of Appeals had refused to do so. According to the court, the
"act of a thing" under that article did not include the act of things
operated by the hand of man.-6
To one trained in the common law, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is an amazing document. It makes no mention whatsoever of
the Court of Cassation's judgment, in the same litigation, that had just
rejected the interpretation of article 1384-1 0 that the Court of Appeals
now adopts. At the same time, it castigates the original trial court for
interpreting article 1384-1 0 in the same way the Court of Cassation had
just interpreted it. But the Court of Appeals judges knew they were
resisting, as was their right, an interpretation which the Court of Cas-
159. See the notes on Jand'heur I by Professors Ripert and Esmein cited in supra
note 153.
160. Lyon, 7 July 1927, 1927 S. Jur. II 406. The Court of Appeals judgment was
unusually prolix. In more than two dozen whereas clauses, it recited all conceivable
arguments against the application of article 1384-1 to the facts of the case.
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sation considered settled and that their principled resistance would surely
prompt a decision on the issue by the full Court.
That decision came three years later when the full Court, all cham-
bers united, solemnly reaffirmed in Jand'heur l161 the decision of the
Civil Chamber in Jand'heur I. Once again the Court followed the
conclusions of its advocate general, but its new Advocate General Matter
delivered a more passionate and less cautious plea for the application
of article 1384-1 0 than had his predecessor Langlois. The judgment
itself, although closely paralleling in style and language the text of the
judgment in Jand'heur I, contained a number of changes which reflected
that bolder approach.
First, the opening whereas clause, which restated the prevailing
interpretation of article 1384-1 °, substituted the term "presumption of
liability" for "presumption of fault" and eliminated language limiting
that presumption to the guardians of moveable property. The first change
emphasized that article 1384-1 0 did more than just shift the burden of
proof on the issue of fault, while the latter change demonstrated the
article's comprehensive coverage of all inanimate things. More impor-
tantly, in the "but whereas" clause immediately preceding the annulment,
the Court deleted any reference to the dangerousness of the thing. After
rejecting the Court of Appeals' distinction between things operated or
not by the hand of man, the Court concluded: "[l]t is not necessary
that the thing have an inherent defect susceptible of causing the injury,
as article 1384 attaches liability to the guard of the thing, not to the
thing itself."
Before analyzing how the Court in Jand'heur II reached its inter-
pretation of article 1384-1 0, the legal effect of that interpretation deserves
some mention. The Jand'heur II formula reads as follows:
Whereas the presumption of liability established by that article
[article 1384-1 0] against one who has under his guard an in-
animate thing which has caused injury to another may be re-
butted only by proof of an unforeseeable event [cas fortuit] or
of an irresistible force [force majeure] or of an external cause
not imputable to the guardian; and it does not suffice to prove
that he committed no fault or that the cause of the damage
remains unknown.
The Court of Cassation has repeated that formula verbatim in thousands
of cases, where it serves as the major premise of a syllogism supporting
the application of article 1384 to the facts of the case. That language,
161. See citations in supra note 146. For a translation of the judgment, see Appendix
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of course, does not appear in the text of article 1384-1 , which speaks
only of a person's liability for the act "of things that he has under his
guard."
It is doubtful whether any of the many legislative bodies that have
sat in France since 1804 would have voted to insert such language into
the text of article 1384-1 °. Even though such an amendment might have
attracted widespread popular support on account of its generosity to
accident victims, the propertied interests and, more recently, the insur-
ance industry surely could have blocked its enactment. 62 Ironically, the
judge serving on the Court of Cassation whom the academic writers
credit with the authorship of the Jand'heur formula (Ambroise Colin)
had previously drafted, when he was a law professor, a bill rejected by
the Parliament to establish a special regime outside the Code to com-
pensate, without proof of fault, the victims of motor vehicle accidents.
63
The Jand'heur 11 formula, however, has acquired the same legal
force as any rule expressly stated in the Code. Indeed, it is the classic
example given in support of Professor Dupeyroux's thesis' 64 that courts
have arrogated for themselves the power to formulate case-law rules
having the same legal effect as statutory rules. The legislature could,
of course, modify the Jand'heur H rule prospectively, but the legislature
can do that for any rule contained in the Code. Until that occurs,
litigants and judges in future cases must recognize that Jand'heur 11
states a binding legal rule which, in Professor Boulanger's phrase, has
become attached to the statutory text.
65
Jand'heur II thus provides the most prominent example of case law
that is binding law in France. The Jand'heur II rule became law not
so much through acceptance by the lower courts, even though that did
come later, as through the full Court of Cassation imposing its sovereign
will on recalcitrant lower court judges. Today it would be unthinkable
for any court to interpret article 1384-1 0 in a way contrary to the
Jand'heur 11 interpretation; and any liberty the French system gives
judges to interpret that article according to their own lights would only
162. See, Savatier, Le gouvernment des juges en mati~re de responsabilit6 civile, in 1
Etudes Lambert, supra note 125, at 453.
163. 2 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 75, no 1263, at 365. Colin was the rapporteur in
Jand'heur L Both Jand'heur opinions, like all French judicial opinions, were anonymous,
but Colin's formative role seems to be recognized unofficially.
164. See, 0. Dupeyroux, "La jurisprudence, source abusive de droit," in 2 M61anges
offerts A Jacques Maury 349 (1960).
165. See, Boulanger, Notations sur le pouvoir createur de la jurisprudence civile, 1958
Rev. tri. dr. civ. 417.
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be, as phrased by Professor Maury, the liberty to err ("mal faire"). 66
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the Jand'heur II formula states
a binding legal rule lies not in the lower courts' faithful application of
it, but in the exigetical efforts it has inspired. The elaborate system of
subrules developed in subsequent decisions under article 1384-1 are
more interpretations of Jand'heur II than they are of the Code text.
That phenomenon occurred in Jand'heur II itself because the subrule
formulated in the third whereas clause, attaching responsibility to the
guardian of the thing regardless of whether a human hand activated it,
appears to be an interpretation, not of any statutory text, but of the
legal rule stated in the opening whereas clause.
The Court of Cassation has continued to interpret its Jand'heur H
formula by defining cas fortuit and force majeure and by ruling that
the presumption of liability applies against the guardian of a thing that
injures another thing. In collision cases, therefore, all persons suffering
property damage may invoke article 1384-1 0 against each other to recover
their respective losses. 67 The Court has also interpreted the word "cause"
in the Jand'heur II formula (the inanimate thing must have "caused
injury to another") to require that the thing "intervene" in the reali-
zation of the injury and not just play a "passive" role. 68 The pre-
sumption of liability does not apply against the guardian of a lawfully
parked vehicle struck by some person or thing, for example, or even
against the driver of a vehicle properly proceeding on the public highway. 169
As one can imagine, the "passivity" of the thing has become the
guardian's principal grounds for exoneration, and proof of' passivity
bears a close resemblance to proof of due care in using the thing in a
normal manner. Indeed, French commentators who saw in Jand'heur
II the Court of Cassation's adoption of the risk theory, 70 or at least
a tendency in that direction,'17 saw in the Court's subsequent interpre-
tation of the causation requirement a substantial retreat to fault-based
liability. 172
166. J. Maury, "Observations sur la jurisprudence en tant que source de droit," in
1 Etudes Ripert, supra note 45, at 28, 47. For a similar analysis of the Jand'heur H
rule, see Jestaz, La jurisprudence: Reflexions sur un malentendu, 1986 D.S. Chr. 9.
167. Cass. civ., 20 Mar. 1933, 1933 D. Jur. I 57 (note Savatier), 1933 S. Jur. I 257
(note Mazeaud). See also A. Weill and F. Terr6, Droit civil: Les obligations n* 748, at
843 (3d ed. 1980).
168. Cass. civ., 27 Jan. 1945, 1945 D. Jur. I 317 (note Savatier). See also H. Capitant,
Les grands arrets de la jurisprudence civile n' 140, at 492 (8th ed. 1984).
169. Id.
170. Josserand, La responsabilit6 du fait des automobiles devant les chambres r~unies
de la Cour de cassation, 1930 D.H. Chr. 25.
171. Capitant, La responsabilit6 du fait des choses inanimes d'apr~s l'arret des Chambres
r6unies du 13 fev. 1930, 1930 D. H. Chr. 29.
172. 2 Trait6 th6orique, supra note 75, n* 1152, at 207-08.
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The discussion so far has assumed that the Court of Cassation's
decision in Jand'heur II did involve creative lawmaking in the sense
that the Court added something to the statutory text. Putting the two
texts (the judgment's first whereas clause and article 1384-1 0) side by
side confirms that assumption: the words are different, and the Jand'heur
II formula is the legal rule that any plaintiff's lawyer would choose.
The full Court of Cassation surely realized that the Jand'heur II formula
added something to the statutory text, but one might wonder whether,
to reiterate Professor Maury's concern, "all voices" were heard before
the Court announced what was in effect a binding legal rule. 173 In
Jand'heur II, the arguments before the full Court of Cassation did
address how the Court should go about interpreting the Code, but gave
the Court surprisingly little assistance on how it should make law.
The full Court of Cassation had before it in Jand'heur II two
detailed analyses of the issues raised by the case: the report of one of
its members, the rapporteur Marc'hadour, 174 and the conclusions of its
Advocate General Matter.1 75 Both retold the familiar story of article
1384-1 's inauspicious beginning, for no one seemed to notice ii in 1804,
and its discovery by the courts beginning with the Teffaine case in 1896.
Marc'hadour, as is customary with the rapporteur, did not explicitly
recommend any particular solution, but Matter feverently concluded in
favor of annulment and for a broad interpretation of the guardian's
liability under article 1384-1 *. Both acknowledged that the issue before
the full Court of Cassation was not just the correctness of the distinction
between things operated or not by the hand of man, but the legitimacy
of the Court's utilizing article 1384-1 0 as the basis for a new system
of strict tort liability paralleling, if not largely superseding, the fault
system found in articles 1382 and 1383. How Marc'hadour and Matter
approached that issue tells us a lot about how French jurists approach
statutory interpretation.
The absence of any recommendation in Marc'hadour's report is
deceptive, because its thrust plainly favors the plaintiff. His approach
to the interpretation of article 1384-1 0 was to ignore its legislative history
and to emphasize the generality of its wording. His principal concerns
were to give effect to those words and not to read into the text dis-
tinctions that were not there. The text imposed liability on the guardian
for the act "of things, that he has under his guard" and did not
173. J. Maury, Observations sur la jurisprudence en tant que source de droit, in Etudes
Ripert, supra note 45, at 28.
174. Reproduced with Jand'heur H in the Dalloz reporter cited in supra note 146.
Marc'hadour's report is also reprinted (in French) in F. Lawson, Tortious Liability for
Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil Law 252-71 (1982).
175. Reproduced with Jand'heur II in the Dalloz reporter, supra note 146.
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distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous things or between things
operated or not by the hand of man. The only textual basis for imposing
or limiting liability was the notion of the "guard," which Marc'hadour
defined in terms of the guardian's control over the thing.
Marc'hadour responded similarly to the defendant's argument that
article 1384-1 0 was only a transitional paragraph and not an independent
basis for imposing liability. Such an interpretation, according to
Marc'hadour, deprived article 1384-1 0 of any meaning. He then sym-
pathetically portrayed the Teffaine decision both as giving meaning to
those general words and responding to contemporary social needs. For
Marc'hadour, given the Teffaine interpretation of article 1384-1 0, its
application to Jand'heur logically followed. Not only was there no textual
basis for limiting article 1384-1 0 to defective things or to things not
operated by the hands of their guardian, but the justification for im-
posing a presumption of liability on the guardian was greater when the
guardian was operating the injury-causing thing than when the thing
had some hidden manufacturing defect that the guardian could not
reasonably discover. As to the scope of that presumption, Marc'hadour
presented the Montagnier interpretation of "liability" as settled law.
Thus, two themes dominated his report: the Court should give general
words in the Code their plain meaning and should follow accepted past
interpretations of the Code.
Matter's argument for a broad interpretation of liability under article
1384-1 °, by contrast, invoked all the recognized theories of interpretation,
which makes it more interesting. He invoked the grammatical approach
to establish the generality of the word "things," quoting dictionaries
and citing the use of the same word in other Code articles. He used
logical arguments to resist the application of reasoning a contrario to
limit the special liability for things to those things specially enumerated
in article 1385 (animals) and article 1386 (collapsing buildings). According
to Matter, the Code's drafters had the unfortunate habit, which he
demonstrated by citing other articles, of stating a general principle and
then providing a list of specific cases that served as examples but that
did not limit the scope of the principle. Matter also made an historical
argument from the rather skimpy, but generally unfavorable, legislative
history. He cited the standard examples of liability for things in Roman
law and in the customary law of pre-Revolutionary France (liability for
animals, for the collapse of a building, and for falling objects) and
boldly suggested that perhaps the drafters had wished to generalize that
liability in the pithy phrases of article 1384-1 0.
Matter must have realized the inadequacy of these traditional in-
terpretive arguments, because he closed his conclusions by eloquently
invoking the evolutive or teleological method of interpretation. He did
so in response to the defendant's argument that the judgment of the
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Civil Chamber in Jand'heur I was innovative, broke with tradition, and
sought to reform the system for compensating victims of motor vehicle
accidents. This reform, argued the defendant, required legislative action,
and the French Parliament, unlike the legislatures in other countries,
had so far refused to adopt it. Matter responded that in the French
system, case law played a creative role and could accomplish that reform
by adapting the Code's 1804 text "to the realities and demands of
modern life.' 76
Matter thus paraphrased, although without any specific acknowl-
edgement, the famous speech advocating judicial updating of the Code
given by the Court of Cassation's first president, Ballot-Beauprd, on
the occasion of the Code's centenary. 77 Matter explicitly recognized that
the evolutive interpretation of statutory texts, which he advocated, was
proper only when the language was general enough to permit it. The
courts could not distort or ignore the plain meaning of words. Fortu-
nately, however, article 1384-10 dated from a time when "one knew
how to draft a statutory text."1 78 The Code's drafters, there and else-
where, had chosen expressions "so supple and so precise at the same
time, so wide and comprehensive that, formulated at the time of the
stage coach, they are just as fitting for the automobile or even the
airplane." 179
Matter's argument is unusual because of its frank invocation of the
teleological approach. French jurists seem happier with arguments more
closely connected to texts. What is surprising to the American observer
is the absence of any fact-based policy arguments for the evolutive
interpretation Matter presented to the court. Nowhere in his conclusions
did he identify those "realities and demands of modern life" that
justified departing from the former liability rules and imposing strict
liability on guardians operating things such as motor vehicles. Perhaps
he thought the changes France had undergone since 1804 were self-
evident. Certainly the facts of the reported cases disclosed the potential
for personal injuries attributable to motor vehicles, and most of these
cases involved pedestrians struck by moving vehicles. That fact pattern
presented the strongest case for the application of the theory of risk:
should not the driver who profited from the use of a motor vehicle
pay the full cost of that usage? But Matter mentioned the tragic facts
of the Jand'heur case only once, and then simply in an introductory
paragraph where he did no more than report the judgment of the initial
trial court. Matter did not invoke the theory of risk or document the
176. 1930 D. Jur. I 57, at 70.
177. See supra note 49.
178. 1930 D. Jur. I 57, at 70.
179. Id.
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plight of pedestrians or of any other class of accident victims. Moreover,
Matter proposed, and the Court adopted, a general rule not limited to
motor vehicles that struck pedestrians, but applicable to all injuries
caused by things.
None of the contemporary commentators questioned the justness of
holding the department store in the Jand'heur case strictly liable for
the crippling of a little girl by its delivery truck. The store surely carried
insurance in the course of its business to cover such mishaps. But the
scope of the Court's ruling caused considerable alarm. Did the Court
really understand the consequences of what it was doing? Professor
Ripert, the Court's most acerbic critic, questioned the rule's impact on
property owners in situations where insurance was not customary. He
added that even the civil code of socialist Russia only imposed liability
for "activities which caused an aggravation of danger for the surround-
ings. ' 180  _
The absence of fact-based policy arguments, so apparent in Matter's
conclusions, is also prevalent in the contemporary academic commentary
on both Jand'heur I and Jand'heur II. This situation is surprising given
the recent publication of Gny's magisterial study on--fioiw courts should
make law.' His approach, like that of the American Legal Realists,
emphasized facts. 8 2 Facts, not just those of particular cases but of life
in general, give courts the data for the construction of legal rules.
G~ny's work, still widely admired in jurisprudential circles, appeared to
have had no direct influence on the remarkable lawmaking enterprise
of the French courts that culminated in Jand'heur II. None of the
participants, so far as is discernible from today's vantage point, cited
his works or invoked his fact-based method.
The explanation for this lack of interest in G6ny's method may be
that the practicing jurists engaged in the lawmaking proces, the advo-
cates, the judges, and the professors who published notes on particular
decisions, did not feel comfortable explicitly acknowledging an inade-
quacy, if not a gap, in the Code that the courts must redress and that
practitioners must play a part in redressing. As bold an advocate as
Matter invoked the evolutive approach mainly for its rhetorical effect,
not as a source of law. His principal argument was one based on
authority. In responding to the department store's argument that the
widow Jand'heur was asking the Court to legislate, Matter reported,
before invoking the well-known phrase of Ballot-Beaupr6, that the Court
180. See note by Ripert to Jand'heur II cited in supra note 146.
181. F. G~ny, Science et technique en droit priv6 positif (4 vols. 1914-24).
182. Herget and Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American
Legal Realism, 73 U. Va. L. Rev. 399, 409-11 (1987) (discussing G6ny).
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of Cassation had applied article 1384-1 ° to inanimate things in at least
twenty-five judgments since 1896. In his peroration, he asked the Court
to maintain that case law because the case law was just and responded
to contemporary needs. 83 Matter in effect argued that, to the extent
there was a gap in the Code, the courts had already filled it, and the
solution they had provided was working pretty well.
Matter's approach minimizes the significance of what the Court of
Cassation did in Jand'heur II. He sought to portray judicial lawmaking
in terms familiar to the common-law practitioner. He saw it more as
an incremental process than something a court must do on a given day
or in a particular case. When French courts do make new law in a
particular case, as the Court of Cassation certainly did in Teffaine, they
tend not to explain very well what they are doing, perhaps because they
do not know how to justify such creativity. Matter did not address the
correctness of Teffaine's discovery of article 1384-1 P, but treated that
discovery as something that had gained acceptance over time.
Whether G6ny himself could have argued more convincingly than
Matter in favor of the Jand'heur II result is unknown, because G6ny
did not write much on the guardian's liability for the act of things.
There is little doubt, however, that he would have found Matter's
arguments unsatisfactory. G6ny did not find logical arguments partic-
ularly helpful in resolving issues of statutory construction. Whether a
court should extend a particular provision to cover analogous cases or
limit it to its literal terms (reasoning a contrario) depended on the
legislature's intent in enacting the particular Provision. 84 Thus, one would
have to determine the legislator's intent in enacting special provisions
on liability for animals and for the collapse of buildings in order to
decide whether to limit those provisions to their terms or to treat them,
as had Matter, as examples of a more general category. G6ny believed
that the courts, in choosing between arguments a contrario and by
analogy, often did what they believed just and equitable under the guise
of implementing some fictional legislative intent.'85
G6ny also would have found troublesome Matter's invention of
legislative intent to suit his purposes. G6ny emphasized that the inter-
preter always should approach the interpretive task without any pre-
conceived result in mind and should respect the legislator's intent where
an intent may be discerned.8 6 With respect to the legislator's intent in
enacting articles 1382 to 1386, G6ny recognized that the lawmaker of
183. 1930 D. Jur. I 57, at 70.
184. 1 G~ny, Mdthode, supra note 16, at 33-36.
185. 1 id. no 21, at 43.
186. 1 id. n o 98, at 265.
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1804 intended to establish a fault-based system, and that the system of
liability based on the theory of risk developed in the 1890s by his
colleagues, Professors Saleilles and Josserand, had no basis in the Code. 18 7
G0ny, nevertheless, expressed warm approval of the risk theory and of
"its praiseworthy desire to obtain just compensation for accident vic-
tims."' '8 He suggested that the courts could achieve the happy results
promised by the risk theory not under the guise of statutory interpretation
but through free scientific research, that is, through overt judicial law-
making. 189
Of course, free scientific research was permissible, under G6ny's
method, only if there were a gap in the Code. Remarkably, G~ny
suggested that there was a gap because the drafters had no intent at
all on the imposition of liability based on the objective creation of a
risk. 19 Evidently, they had no intent on the matter because the idea
had never occurred to them. Or, as G6ny expressed it even more boldly
in a subsequent law review article, their recognition of a fault-based
system did not preclude the judges from imposing liability on the basis
of risk creation where they believed such liability appropriate. 19 Nowhere
did G6ny address the widely accepted view that the legislator of 1804
intended fault to be the sole basis of liability. His supposedly open-
minded search for the intent of the framers, therefore, seems strangely
limited. In order to preserve a suitable domain for free scientific research,
and for the risk theory of his friend and preface-writer Saleilles, G~ny
rather precipitately found a gap which the courts could fill through
explicit lawmaking. Some may find this approach more forthright than
that of those who wish to mute judicial creativity by favoring a more
evolutionary process, 92 but the latter approach may reflect better how
French courts make law over time by obtaining the acceptance of all
concerned.
D. Flying Tiles: the Bardinet and Sons Case
The Court of Cassation's discovery of article 1384-1o in Teffaine,
reaffirmed by the full Court in Jand'heur II, had a profound effect on
French tort law. Prior to Jand'heur, the primary basis for tort liability
187. 2 id. n* 174, at 174.
188. Id.
189. 2 id. n' 174, at 175-77 and 1 id. n* 98, at 267 (rejecting evolutive approach
and invoking "other, more supple" means for updating the Code, i.e., free scientific
research).
190. 2 id. n' 174, at 175.
191. G~ny, Risques et responsabilit6, 1902 Rev. tri. dr, civ. 812, 846.
192. G6ny so argued in a supplementary section he added in the second or 1919
edition of his work. 2 F. G~ny, Mthode, supra note 16, n* 190, at 248-51.
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was fault. The injured party had to prove the defendant's fault under
articles 1382 or 1383 in order to recover except in two situations where
the Code specifically came to the aid of the victim. The Code's drafters,
after stating the general fault principle in articles 1382 and 1383, spe-
cifically imposed liability for injuries inflicted by an animal (article 1385)
or by the collapse of a building (article 1386). By enumerating these
special cases of liability, recognized by Roman law and by the customary
law of pre-Revolutionary France, the drafters plainly intended to favor
the victim by derogating in some fashion from the fault principle, or
at least from the requirement that the injured party prove fault to
recover. By the end of the nineteenth century, the courts had interpreted
the owner's liability under those articles not only to relieve the injured
party from the burden of proving fault, but also to require the owner
to prove some unforeseeable and irresistible force in order to escape
liability. 193
The Jand'heur II decision extended to a much larger group of
accident victims the special advantages previously reserved to those in-
jured by an animal or by the collapse of a building. Now persons injured
by any inanimate thing could invoke an even more generous presumption
of liability against the guardian of the thing. Persons injured by animals
or by falling buildings no longer enjoyed a privileged position. Ironically,
they now enjoyed a less favored position to the extent that the special
statutory texts contained limitations on the owner's liability not found
in the sparser text of article 1384-1 *.
There are no such limitations in article 1385, which is in fact more
generous to the injured party than is article 1384-1 0 because it holds
the owner responsible even if the animal has wandered away or escaped
and is thus no longer under the owner's guard. Article 1386, on the
other hand, does contain a significant limitation on the owner's re-
sponsibility. The owner is "liable" for an injury caused by the collapse
of a building only if the collapse "has occurred as a consequence of
a failure to keep it [the building] in repair or of a defect in its con-
struction." This language in effect introduces a fault component to the
owner's liability under article 1386. To invoke against a building's owner
the presumption of liability found in article 1386, a person injured by
the building's collapse must first establish all the material elements
required by that article, including the lack of maintenance or a defect
in construction that caused the building's collapse. The injured party
suing under article 1386, therefore, is in a less favorable position than
193. Such, of course, was the Montagnier interpretation of the owner's liability under
article 1385 for injuries inflicted by an animal. For a similar interpretation of the owner's
liability under article 1386 for injuries inflicted by the collapse of a building, see Cass.
civ., 19 Apr. 1887, 1888 D. Jur. 1 27, 1887 S. Jur. I 217.
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is the injured party suing under article 1384-1 °, who need only show
that the act of a thing caused the injury and need not show any lack
of maintenance or defect in the thing.
Although neither article 1386 nor its interpretation by the courts
has changed, the legal landscape around it has changed. The Court of
Cassation's construction of a magnificent edifice of presumed liability
on the "little rag" of article 1384-1 0 has transformed article 1386 from
an article that favored accident victims by derogating from the general
fault principle to an article that is less favorable to victims than the
new general principle of strict liability. Article 1386 has become, in the
opinion of most commentators, a legal anachronism deserving a prompt
repeal. 194 Parliament has not responded to that appeal, perhaps because
apartment owners have enough political power to block any legislation
depriving them of the special protection article 1386 now gives them. 19
The Court of Cassation has also refused to eliminate, under the
guise of interpretation, the limitations article 1386 imposes on what the
Court has accomplished under article 1384-1 °. In other words, the Court
has respected the now outdated statutory text despite the inequities it
produces. The line of cases from Teffaine to Jand'heur 11 demonstrates
that the Court of Cassation has the capacity to adapt generally worded
Code provisions to the needs and realities of modern life. The recent
history of article 1386 proves that the Court does not have the same
freedom to modernize an outdated text through interpretation where the
legislature has specified in some detail the prerequisites for the text's
application.
A well-known 1942 case, Bardinet and Sons,'96 demonstrates the
Court of Cassation's respect for the text of article 1386 despite the fact
that its provisions now serve the advantage of the building's owner
rather than, as originally intended, that of the injured party. In that
case, a heavy wind dislodged some tiles from the roof of a building
owned by the family business Bardinet and Sons. The flying debris
damaged the property of an adjoining landowner who brought suit
against Bardinet and Sons under articles 1384-1 0 and 1386. The Court
of Appeals (the second-level trial court) refused to apply article 1386
because it found that the building was in proper repair and there was
no defect in its construction. Thus, the owner of the building was not
194. A. Weill and F. Terr6, Droit civil: Les obligations no 713 and 714, at 782-83
(3d ed. 1980).
195. 4 J. Carbonnier, Droit civil: Les obligations no 106, at 487 (10th ed. 1978)
196. Cass. civ., 4 Aug. 1942, 1943 D. Jur. I 1 (note Ripert), 1943 S. Jur. I 89 (note
Houin). The full designation of the parties is Societ6 "Les Fils de Bardinet" v. Societ6
Ferrd et Duffourg. For the text of the judgment, see also H. Capitant, Les grands arrets
de la jurisprudence civile no 132, at 462 (8th ed. 1984).
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liable under article 1386 for the injury caused by the tiles. Although
the plaintiff had no trouble establishing the building's collapse, for any
partial or total displacement of the materials comprising the building
constitutes a "collapse,"' 197 he had not established that some lack of
maintenance or defect in construction had caused that collapse.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless found Bardinet and Sons liable
by applying article 1384-1' against the company as the guardian of the
injury-producing building. As is often the case, Bardinet and Sons was
not only the owner of the building, but also its guardian in the sense
of enjoying or exercising control over it. The company had sought to
exonerate itself under article 1384-1 0 by proving force majeure, but the
Court of Appeals found that the wind that dislodged the tiles was not
sufficiently violent to have the character of force majeure. The Court's
judgment thus reflected the new relationship between articles 1386 and
1384-1 '. It found liability under article 1384-1 0 when there was no
liability under article 1386, the article that traditionally was more fa-
vorable to the injured party.
The Court of Cassation annulled that judgment for violation of
article 1386. According to the Court, article 1386 specially recognized
the owner's liability for the collapse of a building "under conditions
which derogated from article 1384-1 0. "98 In the absence of these con-
ditions, the owner "could incur no liability for the collapse of the
building."' 199 The Court of Appeals had found that the building's collapse
had caused the plaintiff's injury. Therefore, that Court had violated
article 1386 when it applied the general provisions of article 1384-1 0 to
the facts of the case after it had properly nonsuited the plaintiff under
article 1386.
The Court of Cassation's reasoning provides a good example of
logical interpretation. As one commentator expressed it, the special
provision (article 1386) controlled the general (article 1384-1 0) according
to the words of the maxim specialia generalibus derogant.2°° Ironically,
the Court had rejected the application of that very maxim in Jand'heur
II when it recognized article 1384-1 0 to be a general provision applicable
to all inanimate things and not just to the things enumerated in the
special provisions that followed on animals and collapsing buildings.
The Court's scholastic reasoning did not win much favor with the
commentators, who taxed the Court with inconsistency in determining
when a special provision controls and for invoking exigetical reasoning
197. 2 Traitd thdorique, supra note 75, n' 1042, at 31-32.
198. 1943 D. Jur. I 1, at 1, 1943 S. Jur. I 89, at 90.
199. Id.
200. See note by Houin to Bardinet and Sons cited in supra note 196.
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when it was not appropriate. 20 1 For a specific provision to control,
Professor Ripert argued, the same lawmaker must have formulated both
the general rule and the exception. 2 2 That was not the case here. While
the Code's drafters plainly formulated the special rule found in article
1386, they did not formulate the general rule now found in article 1384-
1 °. The courts formulated that general rule much later, not on exigetical
grounds, but to favor accident victims who, in the age of machines,_
needed more protection than the Code's drafters had given them in
1804. The illogic of denying that additional protection to the injured
party in Bardinet & Sons also did not escape criticism. 203 Why should
the victim struck by flying debris from a building be worse off than
the victim struck by flying debris from a car, machine, or other moveable
property?
Despite this criticism, one can understand the Court of Cassation's
reluctance to allow a rule of its own creation to supersede a clear
statutory rule limiting the owner's liability for the collapse of a building
to cases where the building was improperly maintained or constructed.
Injured persons would always invoke the more favorable rule attached
to article 1384-1 0, and article 1386 would have no further role to play.2 °4
Initially, the Court of Cassation had taken the still more extreme position
that article 1384-1 ° did not apply at all to immoveables (what common
lawyers term "real property"), but only to moveable things. It reaffirmed
that position as recently as 1924, albeit in a case that involved real
property that caught fire. 205 The Parliament had just passed the special
statute which excluded from article 1384-1 ° injuries caused by property
that caught fire; and the Court was no doubt hesitant to apply article
1384-1 ° to an identical fact situation that arose before the Act's prom-
ulgation. The legislature had just warned the Court to tread carefully
in that area. 2 6
Limiting article 1384-1 0 to moveable things, however, produced too
many illogical results; and in 1928 another chamber of the Court of
201. See especially the note by Ripert to Bardinet and Sons cited in supra note 196.
For other critical commentary, see the note by Dejean de la Batie to Cass. civ., 12 July
1966, 1967 J.C.P. 15185, and 2 G. Marty and P. Raynaud, 2 Droit civil: Les obligations
no 457, at 488 (1962).
202. See the note by Ripert to Bardinet and Sons cited in note supra 196.
203. In addition to the notes by Ripert cited in supra note 196, and by Dejean de
la Batie cited in supra note 201, see Becqu6, Coexistence ou incompatibilit6 des pr6-
somptions en matire de responsabilit6 civile, 1952 Rev. tri, dr. civ. 309, 321-22.
204. Dejean de la Batie, himself very critical of the Bardinet and Sons interpretation
of article 1386, acknowledges that many scholars accept it because of its fidelity to the
text of article 1386. See his note cited in supra note 201.
205. Cass. civ., 26 June 1924, 1924 D. Jur. I 159, 1925 S. Jur. I 65 (note Morel).
206. 2 Trait6 th~orique, supra note 75, no 1208, at 288.
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Cassation applied article 1384-1 0 to an injury inflicted by an elevator,
an immoveable by destination under French law (a "fixture" at common
law). 20 7 To apply the presumption of liability against the guardian of a
moveable automobile, but not against the guardian of an immoveable
elevator, was indefensible as a matter of logic and not necessary to
preserve the intended role of article 1386, because a malfunctioning
.elevator that injures does not involve, at least normally, the collapse of
a building. In Jand'heur II, the full Court of Cassation likewise inter-
preted the word "things" in article 1384-1 * to include immovable things
by deleting from its new presumption-of-liability formula the limitation
to moveable things found in the Jand'heur I version. 20 8
In Bardinet and Sons the Court of Cassation could have gone one
step further in eliminating the illogical results attributable to the survival
of article 1386 by allowing the victim injured by a building's collapse
to recover from the owner of the building under article 1384-1 0 whenever
the owner was also the guardian of the building. That route was open
to the Court, even under the exigetical approach, because it would have
left some role for the special provisions in article 1386.20 That article
would still apply if the owner were not the guardian of the building at
the time of the accident, but had entrusted the guard to someone else,
such as a tenant. The maxim specialia generalibus derogant does not
apply where the special provision covers situations not covered by the
general, which is plainly the case under article 1386. While that approach
would leave article 1386 a much smaller role than that envisioned by
its framers, the newly discovered article 1384-1 0 now satisfies the framer's
concern to help persons injured by collapsing buildings in those cases
where the owner is also the guardian of the building.
The framers of article 1386, the argument continues, had only wanted
to insure that persons injured by the collapse of a building had someone
to look to for redress. That someone was to be the owner, who would
be liable not only for his own fault in constructing or maintaining the
building, but would also be liable as a guarantor for the fault of others
against whom he would have recourse, for example, the fault of the
architects or builders who constructed the building or that of the tenants
who were living in it. If that were the legislature's intent in enacting
article 1386, and its imposition of liability on the owner even if he were
not the guardian of the building provides some evidence of such an
intent, then the Court of Cassation would not have violated that intent
by extending the judicially created liability for the act of things to the
207. Cass. req., 6 Mar. 1928, 1928 D.P. Jur. I 97 (note Josserand), 1928 S. Jur. I
225 (note Hugueney).
208. See the texts of the two decisions in Appendices 4 and 5.
209. See note by Dejean de la Batie cited in supra note 201.
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guardian of a collapsed building. Article 1386 does no more than es-
tablish the conditions for owner's liability as owner, and even in that
capacity the courts have held him liable under 1382 for any proven
fault that caused the collapse of a building.
The Court of Cassation in Bardinet and Sons did not accept this
reasoning but held that article 1386 governed the owner's liability for
the collapse of a building. Since 1942, the Court has reiterated that
interpretation on numerous occasions. 210 It has thus become settled,
despite the illogical results it produces. That interpretation is faithful
to the intent of the Code's drafters to subject the owner's liability for
the collapse of a building to the conditions specified in article 1386.
While strained interpretations are available for avoiding that result, the
Court must believe that in this instance fidelity to text and to legislative
intent requires it to stick with article 1386 as written and traditionally
interpreted, rather than adapt it to fit in better with the changed legal
landscape.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The story of the reception of article 1384-1 0 in the French courts
demonstrates that French judges do make law. Not only do they make
law but they have created a working system of case law. What differ-
entiates the French case-law system from the common law is primarily
the formulaic method adopted in France for stating case-law rules. French
judges do not struggle to extract holdings from prior cases, but to
formulate as precisely as possible the applicable case-law rule. This
approach permits greater control by the Court of Cassation over the
law applied by the lower courts.21 1 If a lower court does not apply the
correct formula, annulment will surely follow.
Professor Dawson is correct in criticizing the French courts for not
explaining why a particular case-law rule is the applicable rule.21 2 That
failure may encourage arbitrariness in the selection of the applicable
rule. The French approach nevertheless has a largely unnoticed advan-
tage, which favors the formulation of better rules. The French system
gives more weight to what judges do over time, while the common-law
approach overemphasizes what the judges do when first confronted with
an issue. At common law, the first case becomes the leading precedent,
210. A. Weill and F. Terr6, Droit civil; Les obligations n.718, at 786-88 (3d ed. 1980).
211. A similar desire to control lower court judges may also explain the Supreme
Court's resort to the formulaic style in interpreting open-ended provisions of the United
States Constitution. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 U. Mich. L. Rev. (1985).
212. See J. Dawson, Oracles of the Law 414-15 (1968), discussed in text at supra note
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as happened with Rylands v. Fletcher,213 and in subsequent cases the
lawyers dispute what the first court held. 214 The French approach does
not give as much weight to what the first judges said, but looks to the
acceptance of a case-law rule by subseque it judges. Thus, the "lead"
case under article 1384-1 ° is not Teffaine btut Jand'heur 11. The French
courts have focused on how best to formulate the rule on the guardian's
liability and have largely avoided the sterile inquiry, so familiar to
common-law lawyers, of what the prior case (here, Teffaine) really
held. 215
Another difference between the French system and our own is that
all case-law rules in France are interpretations of statutes. The Code
occupies the field, and the courts must decide all the cases before them
by applying one or more Code provisions. Everything the Court of
Cassation does, therefore, is statutory application or interpretation. G6ny
rejected that position and urged courts to engage in free scientific
research-to fashion the best rule in common-law fashion-whenever
they encountered a gap in the Code; but G6ny's views have not gained
general acceptance. Most French jurists believe that courts should limit
themselves to the interpretation of statutes.
Since statutes provide the only basis for deciding cases, it is not
surprising that statutory interpretation in France is a different and more
elaborate enterprise than it is in the common-law world. Interpreters do
not view their role as merely a mechanical one, implementing the leg-
islature's original intent, or even as a progressive one, implementing
some public purpose which they ascribe to the legislature. 21 6 Rather, the
interpreter's role includes the more creative one of adapting the Code's
general principles to changed circumstances. The process is not a free
one but an evolutive one, requiring considerable judicial lawmaking.
The nature of the Code itself accentuates the interpretative role of
the courts. The Code is not a piece of special interest legislation designed
to address a particular problem. Rather, like our Constitution, it is the
product of a public-spirited effort to state basic principles to govern
213. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
214. See the discussion by the Law Lords in Reads v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C.
156, where the majority refused to apply the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher to an exploding
boiler that did not "escape" from the premises.
215. See the unsuccessful argument by Professor Saleilles on what Teffaine really held
in text at supra note 117.
216. The Legal Process School urges judges to interpret statutes to further some public
purpose attributed to the statute by the court. That purpose need not have been in the
minds of the legislators who enacted the statute. See Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691, 694-
701 (1987) (summarizing views of Hart and Sachs).
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people's affairs for an indefinite period. 2 7 Not surprisingly, French courts
treat these basic principles as starting points for reasoning by analogy
and for developing over time subordinate rules that best meet present-
day needs. American courts have occasionally done the same thing when
interpreting open-ended statutes such as the post-Civil War Civil Rights
Acts and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In recent years scholars have
encouraged courts to interpret such statutes "dynamically" in light of
contemporary needs. 218
This dynamic or evolutive method of interpretation, so new and so
unfamiliar to American lawyers, is more commonplace in France. It
best describes what the Court of Cassation has accomplished under
article 1384-1' . While the Code's drafters did not pay much, if any,
attention to that article, they did include special provisions on liability
for injuries caused by animals or collapsing buildings. These provisions
covered the most common causes of personal injury in 1804 and were
plainly intended to favor the injured party. They had become obsolete
by the end of the century in that they no longer governed most personal
injury cases. Exploding boilers and speeding delivery trucks had become
the new villains. Given that change, it is understandable that the Court
of Cassation interpreted article 1384-1 0 to favor persons injured by such
things. Certainly the legislature could have reacted to the changed cir-
cumstances by amending the Code, but its drafters did not view their
product as needing periodic updating. Even if some legislative updating
would have been a good thing, its absence forced the courts to play a
dynamic role.
This study also instructs us that such a dynamic role is impossible,
or at least more difficult, when the courts confront a narrow, special
interest provision, such as the 1922 fire statute, or a precisely drafted
provision, such as article 1386 on collapsing buildings. In those instances,
the courts' role is necessarily more passive; they must implement the
legislature's intent, or at least the words which encapsulate that intent.
This subordinated judicial role does not mean that detailed or special
interest legislation is necessarily a bad thing, as demonstrated by the
Workmen's Compensation Law of 1898 and the motor vehicle law of
1985. These laws do what common-law rules cannot do in regulating
217. On this distinction between special interest statutes (to be interpreted narrowly
as the ratification of a deal) and more public-regarding statutes (to be interpreted more
purposively), see Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983). For a
defense of the Legal Process approach, which assumes all statutes to be public-regarding,
see Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986).
218. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987);
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527 (1987).
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comprehensively a given subject matter. But this study does show that
what does not work well is a mix of detailed statutory rules, such as
article 1384-2' (the fire statute) and article 1386, and of general principles
subject to judicial evolution, such a article 1384-1 O. Those instances will
likely produce a poor fit-witness the relationship between article 1384-
1 P and article 1386 in Bardinet and Sons-because two different law-
makers are at work.
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APPENDIX I
Texts of Articles 1382 to 1386
of Civil Code as promulgated in 1804
Art. 1382. Any act of a person
which causes injury to another
obligates him by whose fault it
occurred to make reparation.
Art. 1383. Everyone is liable
for the injury he has caused not
only by his act, but also by his
negligence or imprudence.
Art. 1384. [1] A person is liable
not only for the injury he causes
by his own act, but also for that
caused by the act of persons for
whom he is responsible or of
things that he has under his guard.
[2] The father and, after his
death, the mother are liable for
the injury caused by their minor
children who live with them;
[31 Masters and employers, for
the injury caused by their servants
and employees in the exercise of
the functions for which they have
been employed;
[41 Teachers and artisans, for
the injury caused by their pupils
and apprentices during the time
when they were under their su-
pervision.
[51 The aforesaid liability at-
taches unless the father and
mother, teachers and artisans, can
prove that they could not have
prevented the act that gives rise
to this liability.
Art. 1382. Tout fait quel-
conque de l'homme, qui cause A
autrui un dommage, oblige celui
par la faute duquel il est arriv6,
A le r6parer.
Art. 1383. Chacun est respons-
able du dommage qu'il a caus6
non seulement par son fait, mais
encore par sa n6gligence ou par
son imprudence.
Art. 1384. [1] On est respons-
able non seulement du dommage
que l'on cause par son propre
fait, mais encore de celui qui est
caus6 par le fait des personnes
dont on doit r6pondre, ou des
choses que l'on a sous sa garde.
[2] Le pre, et la mre apr~s
le d6c~s du mari, sont responsa-
bles du dommage caus6 par leurs
enfants mineurs habitant avec eux;
[3] Les maitres et les commet-
tants, du dommage caus6 par leurs
domestiques et pr6pos6s dans les
fonctions auxquelles ils les ont
employ6s;
[4] Les instituteurs et les arti-
sans, du dommage caus6 par leurs
616ves et apprentis pendant le
temps qu'ils sont sous leur sur-
veillance.
[5] La responsabilit6 ci-dessus
a lieu, A moins que les pre et
mre, instituteurs et artisans, ne
prouvent qu'ils n'ont pu em-
p~cher le fait qui donne lieu A
cette responsabilit6.
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Art. 1385. The owner of an an-
imal, or the person using it during
the period of usage, is liable for
the injury the animal has caused,
whether it was under his guard
or whether it had strayed or es-
caped.
Art. 1386. The owner of a
building is liable for the injury
caused by its collapse, if this has
occurred as a consequence of a
failure to keep it in repair or of
a defect in its construction.
Art. 1385. Le propri6taire d'un
animal, ou celui qui s'en sert,
pendant qu'il est A son usage, est
responsable du dommage que
l'animal a caus6, soit que l'ani-
mal ffilt sous sa garde, soit qu'il
ffit 6gar6 ou 6chapp6.
Art. 1386. Le propri6taire d'un
batiment est responsable du dom-
mage caus6 par sa ruine, lorsqu'-
elle est arriv6e par une suite du
d6faut d'entretien ou par le vice
de sa construction.
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APPENDIX 2
Text of Present Article 1384
(other articles remain unchanged)
Art. 1384. [1] A person is liable
not only for the injury he causes
by his own act, but also for that
caused by the act of persons for
whom he is responsible or of
things that he has under his guard.
[2] However, a person who re-
tains under any title whatsoever
all or part of an immovable or
of movables which have caught
fire shall not be liable, with re-
gard to third persons, for injuries
caused by this fire unless it is
proved that it is attributable to
his fault or to the fault of persons
for whom he is responsible.1
[3] This provision is not appli-
cable to the relationships between
landlord and tenant which remain
governed by articles 1733 and 1734
of the Civil Code.'
[4] The father and the mother,
so long as they exercise parental
authority, are jointly and sever-
ally liable for the injury caused
by their minor children living with
them. 2
[5] Masters and employers, for
the injury caused by their servants
and employees in the exercise of
the functions for which they have
been employed.
Art. 1384. [1] On est respons-
able non seulement du dommage
que l'on cause par son propre
fait, mais encore de celui qui est
caus6 par le fait des personnes
dont on doit r6pondre, ou des
choses que l'on a sous sa garde.
[2] Toutefois, celui qui detient,
A un titre quelconque, tout ou
partie de l'immeuble ou des biens
mobiliers dans lesquels un incen-
die a pris naissance ne sera res-
ponsable, vis-A-vis des tiers, des
dommages caus6s par cet incendie
que s'il est prouv6 qu'il doit etre
attribu6 a sa faute ou a la faute
des personnes dont il est res-
ponsable. 1
[3] Cette disposition ne s'app-
lique pas aux rapports entre pro-
pridtaires et locataires qui
demeurent r6gis par les articles
1733 et 1734 du Code civil.'
[4] Le p~re et la mere, en tant
qu'ils exercent le droit de garde,
sont solidairement responsables
du dommage caus6 par leurs en-
fants mineurs habitant avec eux. 2
[5] Les maitres et les commet-
tants, du dommage caus6 par leurs
domestiques et pr6pos6s dans les
fonctions auxquelles ils les ont
employ6s;
1. Law of November 7, 1922, inserted new paragraphs 2 and 3 limiting liability for
fires.
2. Law of June 4, 1970, amended former paragraph 2 (now paragraph 4) to make
the mother jointly liable with the father.
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[61 Teachers and artisans, for
the injury caused by their pupils
and apprentices during the time
when they were under their su-
pervision.3
[7] The aforesaid liability at-
taches unless the father and
mother and the artisans can prove
that they could not have pre-
vented the act that gives rise to
this liability.
[8] [Special provision on teach-
ers' liability - not reproduced.]3
[61 Les instituteurs et les arti-
sans, du dommage caus6 par leurs
616ves et apprentis pendant le
temps qu'ils sont sous leur sur-
veillance.3
.[7] La responsabilit6 ci-dessus
a lieu, A moins que les p~re et
mere et les artisans ne prouvent
qu'ils n'ont pu emp~cher le fait
qui donne lieu A cette responsa-
bilitd.
[8] [Special provision on teach-
ers' responsibility - not repro-
duced.]'
3. Law of April 5, 1937, deleted the reference to teachers in present paragraph 6
and added new paragraph 8 limiting the liability of teachers. It also repealed a 1899
amendment which had added a new paragraph on teachers' liability.
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APPENDIX 3
Text of Montagnier v. Leydon
Court of Cassation - Civil Chamber - October 27, 1885
The Court; - See article 1385 of the Civil Code;
[1] Whereas the liability provided by that article rests on a pre-
sumption of fault imputable to the owner of the animal which has
caused the injury or to the person who was making use of it at the
moment of the accident; - and that presumption only yields before the
proof of an unforeseeable event [cas fortuit] or of a fault committed
by the injured party;
[2] Whereas, in the present case, it is established by the findings
of the challenged judgment that the injury caused Montagnier arose
from the fall of stones which a mule, belonging to Leydon and kept
under his guard, had knocked from the top of a wall so as to strike
Montagnier;
[3] Whereas, to relieve Leydon from the consequences of that event,
the Court of Appeals [the second level trial court] limited itself to
declaring that it was not demonstrated that the accident of which Mon-
tagnier had been the victim had occurred by the fault, the negligence
or the imprudence of Leydon, without identifying any circumstances
sufficient to relieve Leydon of that liability; in which the court has
violated the provisions of article 1385 cited by the petition;
For these reasons, annul. ...
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APPENDIX 4
Text of Jand'heur I
Court of Cassation - Civil Chamber - February 21, 1927
The Court; - On the sole ground; - See article 1384, paragraph 1
of the Civil Code;
[1] Whereas the presumption of fault established by that article
against one who has under his guard an inanimate moveable thing which
has caused injury to another may be rebutted only by proof of an
unforeseeable event [cas fortuit] or of an irresistible force [force majeure]
or of an external cause not imputable to the guardian; and it does not
suffice to prove that he committed no fault or that the cause of the
injury remains unknown;
[2] Whereas, on April 22, 1925, a delivery truck belonging to the
corporation Maison Blumsel knocked down and gravely injured the minor
Lisa Jand'heur; and the challenged judgment refused to apply the cited
text for the reason that at the moment of the accident the truck was
operated by Stanlet, a driver in the employ of the owner, and that,
therefore, to obtain reparation for the loss, the victim must establish
against the driver a fault attributable to him within the terms of article
1382 of the Civil Code;
[3] But whereas the statute, for application of the presumption which
it provides, does not distinguish according to whether the thing which
caused the injury was operated or not by the hand of man; and that
it suffices that it is a thing subject to the necessity of a "guard" by
reason of the dangers to which it may expose others; -From which it
follows that in ruling as it did, the challenged judgment has reversed
the order of proof and violated the text of the cited law;
For these reasons, annul ... and remand before the Court of
Appeals of Lyon.
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APPENDIX 5
Text of Jand'heur II
Court of Cassation - All Chambers United - February 13, 1930
The Court; - Ruling all chambers united; - On the ground in the
petition; - See article 1384, paragraph I of the Civil Code:
[1] Whereas the presumption of liability established by that article
against one who has under his guard an inanimate thing which has
caused injury to another may be rebutted only by proof of an unfore-
seeable event [cas fortuit] or of an irresistible force [force majeure] or
of an external cause not imputable to the guardian; and it does not
suffice to prove that he committed no fault or that the cause of the
injury remains unknown;
[2] Whereas, on April 22, 1925, a delivery truck belonging to the
corporation les Galeries belfortaises knocked down and injured the minor
Lise Jand'heur; and the challenged judgment refused to apply the cited
text for the reason that an accident caused by a motor vehicle in
movement, under the impulsion and direction of man, did not constitute,
so long as there was no proof that the injury was due to a defect in
the vehicle, the act of a thing under one's guard within the terms of
article 1384, paragraph 1, and that, therefore, the victim must, to obtain
reparation for the loss, establish some fault imputable to the driver;
[3] But whereas the statute, for the application of the presumption
which it provides, does not distinguish according to whether the thing
which caused the injury was or was not activated by the hand of man;
and it is not necessary that the thing have an inherent defect susceptible
of causing the injury, as article 1384 attaches liability to the guard of
the thing, not to the thing itself; - From which it follows that in ruling
as it did, the challenged judgment reversed the order of proof and
violated the text of the cited law;
For these reasons, annul . . and remand before the Court of
Appeals of Dijon.
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